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De Finettian Logics of Indicative
Conditionals
Part I: Trivalent Semantics and Validity
Paul Égré, Lorenzo Rossi, Jan Sprenger
Abstract
This paper explores trivalent truth conditions for indicative conditionals, examin-
ing the “defective” table put forward by de Finetti (1936), as well as Reichenbach
(1944), first sketched in Reichenbach (1935). On their approach, a conditional
takes the value of its consequent whenever its antecedent is True, and the value
Indeterminate otherwise. Here we deal with the problem of choosing an ade-
quate notion of validity for this conditional. We show that all standard trivalent
schemes are problematic, and highlight two ways out of the predicament: one
pairs de Finetti’s conditional (DF) with validity as the preservation of non-False
values (TT-validity), but at the expense of Modus Ponens; the other modifies de
Finetti’s table to restore Modus Ponens. In Part I of this paper, we present both
alternatives, with specific attention to a variant of de Finetti’s table (CC) proposed
by Cooper (1968) and Cantwell (2008). In Part II, we give an in-depth treatment
of the proof theory of the resulting logics, DF/TT and CC/TT: both are connexive
logics, but with significantly different algebraic properties.
1 Introduction
Choosing a semantics for the indicative conditional of natural language “if A, then
C” (henceforth, A → C) usually involves substantial tradeoffs. The most venera-
ble account identifies the indicative conditional with the material conditional ¬A ∨ C
and has several attractive features: it is truth-functional, allows for a straightforward
treatment of nested conditionals, and satisfies various intuitive principles such as Con-
ditional Proof and Import-Export. However, the material conditional account severs
the link between antecedent and consequent: Suppose John was not in Paris yester-
day. Then “if John was in Paris yesterday, then he will be in Milan tomorrow” is true
regardless of John’s travels plans. The inferential dimension of conditionals, and in
particular the link between truth and justified assertion, are completely lost in this
picture.
Seeking a way out of this predicament, Stalnaker (1968, 1975) proposed to give up
truth-functionality and to strengthen the truth conditions of the indicative conditional
1 0
1 1 0
0 # #
1 # 0
1 1 · 0
# · · ·
0 # · #
Figure 1: “Defective” bivalent table (left) and trivalent incomplete expansion (right)
as follows: A → C is true if and only if C is true in the closest possible A-world—i.e.
the closest world in which the antecedent is true. This proposal has many virtues but
also some limitations, on which we say more in the next section.
A second strategy admits that the truth conditions of the indicative conditional may
not be truth-functional, or perhaps agree with those of the material conditional (e.g.,
Jackson 1987), but in any case they are a matter of secondary importance. What mat-
ters, ultimately, is the assertability or “reasonableness” of a conditional A → C. This
notion is often explicated in probabilistic terms, by analyzing the conditional as ex-
pressing a supposition that precedes the evaluation of the consequent, and by focusing
on the probability of C given A, in symbols Pr(C|A). This strategy is popular among
cognitive scientists (e.g., Evans et al. 2007; Over et al. 2007), and among philosophers
who focus on the evidential and inferential dimension of a conditional (e.g., Adams
1965, 1975; Edgington 1995; Krzyzanowska 2015; Douven 2016). To our mind, how-
ever, it would be preferable to have a theory that explains how assertability conditions
are related to, and can be motivated from, the truth conditions of a conditional.
This paper is an attempt to connect the dimensions of truth and assertability in
a principled way, and to construct a semantics that preserves the most attractive fea-
tures of both propositional and non-propositional accounts. Due to well-known im-
possibility results (e.g., Gibbard 1980; Lewis 1986), this means that we have to leave
the familiar framework of bivalent logic. Our starting point is the intuition voiced by
de Finetti (1936), Reichenbach (1944, 168) and Quine (1950) (crediting Ph. Rhinelander
for the idea), that uttering a conditional amounts to making a conditional assertion:
the speaker is committed to the truth of the consequent when the antecedent is true,
but committed to neither truth nor falsity of the consequent when the antecedent is
false.
The idea that a conditional with a false antecedent has no classical truth value is
sometimes summarized in what Kneale and Kneale (1962) have named the “defective”
truth table, where the symbol ‘#’ marks a truth value gap (Figure 1), and whose first
appearance may be found in Reichenbach (1935, 381).1 When the gap is handled as a
1De Finetti presented his paper in Paris in the same year 1935, with explicit reference to Reichenbach
1935, but criticizing the latter’s objective interpretation of probability. To the best of our knowledge,
Reichenbach’s 1935 book does not quite present de Finetti’s three-valued table, but some variants in-
stead. However Reichenbach (1944, 168, fn.2) traces quasi-implication back to his previous opus. In our
view, the de Finetti conditional may therefore be called the de Finetti-Reichenbach conditional, but for
simplicity and partly for established usage, we stick to calling it the DF conditional. See also Milne 1997,
Baratgin, Over, and Politzer 2013, and Over and Baratgin 2017 on the history of the defective table.
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value of its own (we represent it by 1/2, for “indeterminate”), and so as a possible input
for semantic evaluation, then the “defective” two-valued conditional naturally leads
to truth conditions within a trivalent (=three-valued) logic. For de Finetti, asserting
a conditional of the form “if A then C” is a conditional assertion: an assertion that is
retracted, or void, if the antecedent turns out to be false. In this respect, it is akin
to making a bet that if A then C. When A is realized and C is false, the bet is lost;
when A is realized and C is true, the bet is won; when A is not realized, however, the
bet is simply called off (more on this in Section 2). The trivalent table proposed by
de Finetti for the conditional (henceforth →DF) is given in Figure 2. The same table
is put forward by Reichenbach (1944), who calls it quasi-implication. Like de Finetti,
Reichenbach considers that some conditionals are void when the antecedent is false,
though Reichenbach’s interpretation of the third truth value differs, being driven by
measurement-theoretic considerations in quantum physics.2
f→DF 1 1/2 0
1 1 1/2 0
1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2
0 1/2 1/2 1/2
Figure 2: The truth table for de Finetti’s trivalent conditional.
The truth table given by de Finetti and Reichenbach mirrors an interpretation on
which the conditional is indeterminate when its antecedent is not true ( 6= 1).3 How-
ever, understanding the conditional as a conditional assertion is compatible with more
choices of a trivalent truth table, especially in the second line, namely when the an-
tecedent is indeterminate (viz. the antecedent might be a conditional with false an-
tecedent). Two notable proposals, the first due to Cooper (1968) and independently to
Cantwell (2008), the second to Farrell (1979), are given in Figure 3:
Which trivalent table is the most adequate? Baratgin et al. (2013) approached this
question experimentally. They asked participants to evaluate various indicative con-
ditional sentences as “true”, “false” and “neither”, by manipulating the truth value of
the antecedent and consequent (making them clearly true, false, or uncertain). They
2Closer to the interpretation of the third truth value that features in Bochvar (1937), Reichenbach
considers that some conditionals are meaningless when the antecedent concerns an event whose precise
measurement is impossible (for instance, we cannot in general simultaneously measure position and
momentum of a particle with arbitrary degree of precision). Reichenbach treats the third truth value as
objectively indeterminate rather than as expressing a notion of subjective ignorance, as de Finetti does.
In motivating this interpretation, Reichenbach refers explicitly to the Bohr-Heisenberg interpretation of
quantum mechanics.
3Related proposals include Jeffrey 1963, Belnap 1970, Manor 1975, Farrell 1986, Dubois and Prade
1994, McDermott 1996, Rothschild 2014, and Kapsner 2018. We note that the DF table was reintroduced
several times in the past decades, very often without prior notice of either de Finetti or Reichenbach, and
sometimes with separate motivations in mind, viz. Blamey (1986), who calls it transplication, to highlight
its hybrid character between a conjunction and an implication, or recently Kapsner (2018), who came up
with the scheme specifically to deal with connexiveness. More on this will be said below.
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f→CC 1 1/2 0
1 1 1/2 0
1/2 1 1/2 0
0 1/2 1/2 1/2
f→F 1 1/2 0
1 1 1/2 0
1/2 1/2 1/2 0
0 1/2 1/2 1/2
Figure 3: Truth tables for the Cooper-Cantwell conditional (left) and the Farrell condi-
tional (right).
conclude that the original de Finetti table is better-supported than its competitors and
that participants’s judgments are well-correlated with the de Finettian bet interpreta-
tion of conditionals. However, the focus on (intuitions about) truth tables neglects the
inferential properties of conditionals, that is, how we should reason with them. For
that, we need an analysis of the notion of logical validity. Indeed, the same truth tables
can support radically distinct entailments, depending on how validity is defined.
In trivalent logic, several notions of validity can be considered, and they yield sig-
nificantly distinct predictions (Égré and Cozic 2016). Consider validity as preservation
of truth (i.e., the value 1) from premises to conclusion in an argument. Following the
terminology of Cobreros et al. (2012), we call this strict-to-strict validity, or SS-validity.
An alternative is to define validity as the preservation of non-falsity ({1, 1/2}), also
known as tolerant-to-tolerant or TT-validity. Other schemes considered in the literature
are the intersection of SS and TT (see McDermott 1996), as well as so-called mixed
(strict-to-tolerant, tolerant-to-strict) consequence relations (ST, TS). All schemes have
advantages and drawbacks, but some combinations of a conditional operator with a
validity scheme appear better than others.
In this paper, we bring together the research strands on validity in trivalent logic
and trivalent semantics for indicative conditionals. More precisely, we conduct a sys-
tematic investigation of the main trivalent semantics for defective conditionals, and
isolate the most promising combinations of truth tables and validity relations. To the
best of our knowledge, no such systematic comparison has been conducted so far. In
particular, apart from Cooper (1968), we are not aware of an axiomatization of the
logics based on a trivalent semantics for the indicative conditional.
We fill this gap in our paper and proceed in two main parts. Part I of this paper
focuses on semantics: it reviews the main motivations for the de Finetti conditional
(Section 2) and expounds the problems it faces when selecting an adequate trivalent
consequence relation. This is what we call the “validity trilemma” for the de Finetti
conditional (Section 3): the de Finetti conditional must either fail to support any sen-
tential validity, support unacceptable arguments, or fail Modus Ponens. We present
two ways out of this predicament: the first bites the bullet and associates de Finetti’s
conditional with a notion of tolerant-to-tolerant validity that fails Modus Ponens (Sec-
tion 4). The other consists in modifying de Finetti’s table so as to restore Modus Po-
nens for the same notion of validity. We specify the class of trivalent conditionals that
support Modus Ponens and are adequate for TT-validity (“Jeffrey conditionals"), and
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we distinguish, among those, the conditional introduced independently by Cooper
and Cantwell (Section 5). We end part I of this paper with a comparison between the
two logics that ensue from those considerations, DF/TT (de Finetti-TT) and CC/TT
(Cooper-Cantwell-TT), with an indication of their commonalities (in particular both
are connexive logics, Section 5) and limitations (in particular both retain the Linearity
principle of two-valued logic, see Section 6). In part II, we further this comparison
with an in-depth investigation of the proof theory and algebraic properties of those
two logics.
2 The de Finetti Conditional
2.1 Philosophical Motivation
Ramsey (1926) was likely the first philosopher to connect an assertion of a proposition
A with an implicit disposition to bet on A, and to interpret an indicative conditional
A → C as a conditional assertion where we suppose the antecedent, and reason on
that basis about the consequent. His views strongly influenced de Finetti, who com-
bined both ideas of Ramsey’s by postulating an isomorphism between the conditions
that settle the truth of a (conditional) proposition, and the conditions that settle the
winner of a (conditional) bet. Evaluating the truth or falsity of a conditional propo-
sition, assertion or event requires supposing the antecedent in the same way that a
conditional bet on C given A can only be won or lost if A is true; if A is false, the bet
will be called off.
Hence, while the truth value of an ordinary, non-conditional proposition A is set-
tled by either A or ¬A, the truth value of a conditional proposition or assertion—de
Finetti uses the notation C/A—is settled by the corresponding pair A∧ C and A∧¬C
(de Finetti 1936, 568, emphasis in original): 4
“C’est ici qu’il paraît indiqué d’introduire une logique spéciale à trois
valeurs, comme nous l’avions déjà annoncé : C et A étant deux événements
(propositions) quelconques, nous dirons triévénement C/A (C subordonné
à A), l’entité logique qui est considérée
1. vraie si C et A sont vrais;
2. fausse si C est faux et A est vrai;
4In the English translation of R. Angell, the quote goes: “It is here that introduction of a special
logic of three values seems indicated, as we have already announced: C and A being any two events
(propositions) whatever, we will speak of the tri-event C/A (C given A), the logical entity which is
considered:
1. true if C and A are true;
2. false if C is false and A true;
3. null if A is false
(one does not distinguish between “not A and C" and “not A and not C", the tri-event being only a
function of A and A ∧ C).”
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3. nulle si A est faux
(on n’a pas de distinction entre “non A et C” et “non A et non C”, le
triévénement ne devant être fonction que de A et C ∧ A).”
This approach explains the intuition that upon observing A∧C, we feel compelled
to say that the (previously made) conditional assertion C/A was right, that it has
been verified.5 Similarly, the conditional assertion C/A is falsified by the observation of
A ∧ ¬C: we have been proven wrong by the facts. The indicative conditional A → C
shall, in the rest of this paper, be understood as a conditional assertion C/A whose
truth conditions correspond to the conditions that determine the result of a conditional
bet. We now define a corresponding class of conditional operators:
Definition 2.1 (de Finettian operators). A trivalent binary operator is called de Finettian
if it agrees with de Finetti’s truth conditions when the antecedent is determinate, that is, when
the antecedent takes the value 1 or the value 0.
Equivalently, an operator is de Finettian if it agrees on the first and third row of
the table in Figure 2: it takes the value indeterminate when its antecedent is false,
and the value of its consequent when its antecedent is true. From the class of de
Finettian operators, de Finetti selects the truth conditions that assign value 1/2 to the
conditional whenever the antecedent is itself indeterminate. Note that this grouping
of indeterminate with false antecedents is not covered by the above epistemological
motivation; in fact, this choice is a classical point of contention between trivalent logics
of conditionals. De Finetti’s choice resembles Bochvar’s scheme for trivalent operators
(a.k.a. the Weak Kleene scheme), where the value 1/2 is carried over from any part of a
sentence to the whole sentence (Bochvar 1937). Similarly, he assumes that a conditional
is undefined as soon as antecedent or consequent are undefined. As we know from the
theory of presupposition projection (Beaver and Krahmer 2001), however, Bochvar’s
choice is not the most adequate to account for the transmission of indeterminate values
from smaller to larger constituents, and therefore it should not be viewed as mandated
by the rest of de Finetti’s motivations for the conditional. In fact, de Finetti himself
does not handle conjunction and disjunction à la Bochvar/Weak Kleene, but in line
with the Strong Kleene scheme (see below).
2.2 Main benefits of the approach
De Finetti’s trivalent approach has the potential to avoid the paradoxes of material
implication and yields a variety of benefits.6 First of all, it is very simple and has a
clear motivation: asserting a conditional amounts to making a conditional assertion;
conditionals express dispositions to bet just as ordinary assertions do. The trivalent
5See also Cantwell 2008, and the “hindsight problem” in Khoo 2015.
6In particular, paired with SS-validity, the de Finetti conditional supports neither the entailment from
¬A to (A → C), nor the entailment from C to(A → C). For TT-validity, only the former scheme is
blocked.
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approach treats conditionals as expressing propositions, in agreement with their lin-
guistic form and assertive usage; only their truth conditions cannot be expressed in
bivalent logic. This is a substantial advantage over non-propositional views that have
to explain the gap between linguistic form and philosophical theorizing.
Second, de Finettian conditionals keep the epistemic notion of assertability and the
semantic notion of truth separate, while allowing for a fruitful interaction: degrees of
assertability can be defined directly in terms of the truth conditions. For a probability
function Pr on a propositional language, and assuming X is a Boolean sentence or a
simple conditional,7 we define the degree of assertability to be:
Ast(X) = Pr(X is true|X has a classical truth value) (A)
(see also McDermott 1996; Cantwell 2006; Rothschild 2014). Trivalent semantics re-
places the familiar norm of asserting what is probably true by the equally plausible
norm of asserting what is (much) more likely to be true than to be false. This col-
lapses to the classical picture Ast(X) = Pr(X is true) for bivalent propositions. For
X = A→ C, and assuming that C is bivalent, we obtain
Ast(A→ C) = Pr(A→ C is true|A→ C has a classical truth value)
= Pr(A ∧ C is true|A is true)
= Pr(C|A)
We thus obtain Adams’ Thesis (sometimes also called “The Equation”, and read as a
thesis about the probability of A→ C), a plausible principle for the assertability of con-
ditionals supported by patterns observed in natural language (Stalnaker 1968; Adams
1975; Dubois and Prade 1994; Evans et al. 2007; Over et al. 2007; Égré and Cozic 2011;
Over 2016).8 Similarly, the suppositional reading of conditionals as expressing condi-
tional degrees of belief (e.g., Ramsey 1926; Edgington 1995) can be naturally grounded
in trivalent semantics. Other theories, notably Spohn (2013)’s, accept Adams thesis,
but view is as dependent on a more fundamental notion of conditional belief, cap-
tured by rank-ordering instead of probability. That theory too is compatible with de
Finetti’s trivalent approach.9
The close relationship between truth and assertability allows us to explain intu-
itions which conflict at first with the trivalent view. For example, a sentence such
as:
(1) If Paul is in Paris, then Paul is in France.
would typically be judged as true, whereas trivalent semantics regard this as an em-
pirical question: when Paul is in Berlin, the sentence has indeterminate truth value.
7We refer to section 6 for a discussion of compounds of conditionals.
8For recent criticisms of Adams’ Thesis, see Douven and Verbrugge 2010 and
Skovgaard-Olsen, Singmann, and Klauer 2016.
9Compare Spohn (2013, 1083)’s definition of conditional rank with the probabilistic derivation of Ast
above. The conditional rank of C given A is κ(C|A) = κ(A ∩ C) − κ(A), provided κ(A) < ∞. As
highlighted by Spohn, a bridge is given by a logarithmic transformation.
7
However, the trivalent view can offer an error theory since (1) is maximally assertable
regardless of Paul’s whereabouts (Pr(C|A) = 1). When we call sentences such as (1)
“true”, what we really mean is that they command consent, that they are “maximally
assertable” (see also Adams 1975). Since assertability conditions are fully defined in
terms of truth conditions, this defense is arguably not ad hoc. In sum, on this view, in-
dicative conditionals are factual—their truth and falsity is a matter of correspondence
with the world—, like for predictions about future events, while their assertability is
epistemic and is represented probabilistically.
Thirdly, the de Finetti conditional satisfies the following identity:
A→ (B→ C) ≡ (A ∧ B)→ C (Import-Export)
Here, “≡” means that the truth values of A → (B → C) and (A ∧ B) → C coincide
according to the de Finetti tables. Import-Export expresses the idea that right-nesting
a conditional is just the same as adding a further supposition. Gibbard (1980) proved
that there is no truth-conditional operator → that (i) satisfies Import-Export; (ii) vali-
dates A→ C whenever A classically entails C; (iii) is strictly stronger than the material
conditional. In Stalnaker’s and Lewis’s possible world semantics, Import-Export thus
fails. McGee (1989) proposed a modification of Stalnaker’s semantics that restores
Import-Export and is stronger than the material conditional, giving up (ii).10 How-
ever, it involves syntactic restrictions on the sentences appearing as antecedents. The
advantage of de Finetti’s conditional is that it can satisfy Import-Export without any
syntactic restrictions, and within a truth-conditional framework. Depending on which
notion of validity it is paired with, it may or may not obviate the conditions of Gib-
bard’s theorem. As we will see, however, even when it falls prey to Gibbard’s result,
it need not have all properties of its material counterpart.
3 Comparing Schemes for Validity
We now introduce and compare the main notions of validity that can be used in rela-
tion to de Finetti’s conditional. By so doing, we expose a problem for the de Finetti
conditional: all of the basic schemes available for validity in trivalent logic appear to
overgenerate or to undergenerate relative to general principles of conditional reason-
ing.
3.1 Evaluations and Validity
Throughout the paper, we let L be a propositional language featuring denumerably
many propositional variables (indicated as p0, p1, . . .), whose logical connectives in-
clude ¬ and ∧ (the others, ∨ and ⊃, are defined as usual). We call L→ the language
10See McGee (1985, 1989) on the failure of Modus Ponens in that logic. Mandelkern (forthcoming)
observes a certain tension between Import-Export and classical conjunction, suggesting to restrict Import-
Export accordingly. However, our findings show that the canonical extension of classical conjunction to
trivalent logics (i.e., Strong Kleene truth tables) is perfectly compatible with Import-Export. The observed
tensions may therefore be a peculiar feature of bivalent logic.
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obtained from L by adding a new conditional connective, in symbols →, to the prim-
itive stock of logical constants of L. We use uppercase Latin letters (A, B, C, . . .) as
meta-variables for L- and L→-sentences, and For to denote the set of formulae of the
language L→. With a slight notational abuse, we will write Γ, A rather than Γ ∪ {A}
(for Γ a set of L→-formulae and A a L→-formula), in order to improve readability.
For all trivalent semantics of the conditional that we consider, negation and con-
junction are interpreted via the familiar Strong Kleene truth tables (introduced by
Łukasiewicz 1920, also featuring in de Finetti 1936):
f¬
1 0
1/2 1/2
0 1
f∧ 1 1/2 0
1 1 1/2 0
1/2 1/2 1/2 0
0 0 0 0
Figure 4: Truth tables for negation and conjunction
We can now proceed to define evaluations and consequence relations for the de
Finetti conditional.
Definition 3.1 (Classical, SK-, and DF-evaluation).
- A classical evaluation is a function from L-sentences to {1, 0} that interprets ¬ and ∧ by the
functors f¬ and f∧ restricted to the values 1 and 0.
- A Strong Kleene evaluation (or SK-evaluation) is a function from L-sentences to {1, 1/2, 0}
that interprets ¬ and ∧ by the functors f¬ and f∧.
- A de Finetti evaluation (or DF-evaluation) is a function from For to {1, 1/2, 0} interpreting
¬, ∧, and→ by the functors f¬, f∧ and f→DF .
Given an evaluation, we can distinguish two levels of truth for a sentence, namely
T-truth (for tolerant truth) and S-truth (for strict truth), following Cobreros et al. 2012
and Cobreros et al. 2015.11 Identifying the value 1 with the True, the value 1/2 with the
Indeterminate, and the value 0 with the False, then S-truth is for a sentence to be True,
whereas T-truth is for a sentence to be non-False. The two notions obviously coincide
relative to classical evaluations, but they come apart relative to trivalent evaluations.
Definition 3.2 (T-truth and S-truth).
- An evaluation v : For 7−→ {1, 1/2, 0} makes a sentence A strictly true (or S-true)
provided v(A) = 1.
- An evaluation v : For 7−→ {1, 1/2, 0} makes a sentence A tolerantly true (or T-true)
provided v(A) > 0.
11Zardini (2008) talks of levels of goodness for a sentence, and Cobreros et al. (2015) talk of levels of
assertability, rather than truth. Given our separation of truth and assertability in the previous section, we
avoid this terminology.
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Following Chemla, Égré, and Spector (2017) and Chemla and Égré (2019b), we sin-
gle out five notions of validity in a trivalent setting, depending on whether validity
is defined as the preservation of truth, non-falsity, or as some combination of those.
Those five notions of validity are not the only conceivable ones in trivalent logic, but
there is a sense in which they form a natural class.12 In particular, the five schemata
under discussion are all monotonic, and they are all the monotonic trivalent schemata
(see Chemla and Égré 2019b for a proof), meaning that an inference remains valid by
the inclusion of more premises. We leave open whether a nonmonotonic scheme for
validity might offer a good fit for the original de Finetti table.13
Definition 3.3 (SS-, TT-, SS∩TT-, ST- and TS-validity). For every {Γ, A} ⊆ For, for
every X-evaluation, we say that:
- Γ |=X/SS A, provided every X-evaluation that makes all sentences of Γ S-true also makes
A S-true.
- Γ |=X/TT A, provided every X-evaluation that makes all sentences of Γ T-true also makes
A T-true.
- Γ |=X/(SS∩TT) A, provided every X-evaluation that makes all sentences of Γ S-true also
makes A S-true, and every X-evaluation that makes all sentences of Γ T-true also makes
A T-true.
- Γ |=X/ST A, provided every X-evaluation that makes all sentences of Γ S-true also makes
A T-true.
- Γ |=X/TS A, provided every X-evaluation that makes all sentences of Γ T-true also makes
A S-true.
Relative to L and to SK-evaluations, SS-validity determines the so-called Strong
Kleene logic, whereas TT-validity determines Priest’s logic LP. SS∩ TT corresponds to
the so-called Symmetric Kleene logic, whereas TS and ST correspond to the so-called
Tolerant-Strict and Strict-Tolerant Logics (also called the logics of q-consequence and
p-consequence: Malinowski 1990; Cobreros et al. 2012; Frankowski 2004). In general,
12See Chemla et al. (2017) for general arguments regarding the oddness of SS∪TT in particular. In
the present case, taking the union of SS and TT would obviously not solve the overgeneration problem
raised in the next section, in particular regarding the entailment to the converse conditional. Cooper
(1968) restricts TT to bivalent atomic valuations – what Humberstone (2011, §7.19, 1044 and following)
calls ‘atom-classical’ valuations: we set aside that restriction, which makes no essential difference to our
discussion here. Farrell (1979) sketches another variant, which we can set aside on the same grounds (see
next footnote).
13Farrell (1979) introduces a notion of sentential validity that may be generalized into a nonmonotonic
notion of argument-validity. On his definition, A is valid provided it is TT-valid, and there is a valuation
that gives A the value 1. We may generalize this to: Γ |= A provided Γ TT-entails A and there is at least
one valuation that gives the formulae in Γ and A the value 1. On that definition, A |= A, but A,¬A 6|= A
(we are indebted to a remark by T. Ferguson in relation to that fact). We note that like standard TT-
validity, this nonmonotonic restriction still fails Modus Ponens. As such, it would not add a separate
route from the one described with standard TT-validity.
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our definitions of validity are relative to the choice of a type of evaluation function
(e.g., classical, SK, DF); however, in the rest of this section, we always refer to DF-
evaluations, in line with our focus on the de Finetti conditional.
An interesting feature of the DF/TT-logic is that it implies mutual entailment
between its conditional and the material conditional. The following inferences are
DF/TT-valid:
¬A ∨ B |=DF/TT A→ B A→ B |=DF/TT ¬A ∨ B
Moreover, we also have:
|=DF/TT (¬A ∨ B)↔ (A→ B)
where↔ is de Finetti’s biconditional, that is, A↔ B is defined as (A→ B)∧ (B → A).
In fact, all of Gibbard’s conditions (i) to (iii) are met by de Finetti’s conditional in
DF/TT, and so the mutual entailment between de Finetti’s conditional and its material
counterpart may be seen as an instance of Gibbard’s collapse result.
Remarkably, however, although ⊃ and→ are equivalent in DF/TT-logic, they don’t
obey the same principles. For instance:
A→ B |=DF/TT ¬(A→ ¬B) but ¬A ∨ B 6|=DF/TT ¬(¬A ∨ ¬B).
3.2 A trilemma for de Finetti’s conditional
Among the previous schemes, which one is the most adequate relative to de Finetti’s
conditional? We begin with applying the SS-validity scheme over DF-evaluations, and
similarly, mutatis mutandis, for the other schemes. It is easy to see that:
A→ B |=DF/SS A ∧ B
That is, the conditional entails conjunction. This property is not intuitive, but perhaps
less bad than it seems since the trivalent approach is based on de Finetti’s idea of
identifying the truth conditions for conditionals with the conditions for winning a
conditional bet. Worse is that the de Finetti conditional entails its converse on a SS-
validity scheme:14
A→ B |=DF/SS B→ A
The SS-scheme is thus very distant from an intuitive notion of reasonable inference
with conditionals since supposing A and asserting B is very different from supposing
B and asserting A. The TT-scheme avoids this problem since
A→ B 6|=DF/TT A ∧ B A→ B 6|=DF/TT B→ A
14Reichenbach (1944, 152) claims the contrary, but because he seems to focus on the fact that A → B
and B → A have different tables. He does not appear to see that they take the value 1 exactly in the
same place, despite electing SS-validity as his default notion of validity, in particular to guarantee Modus
Ponens.
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McDermott (1996) therefore proposes the SS∩ TT-scheme to preserve the idea that
validity is preservation of the value 1, but to weed out the implication from a condi-
tional to the conjunction and to its converse. The SS∩ TT consequence relation suffers,
however, from the drawbacks of both of its constituents, as evidenced by the following
observations:
6|=DF/SS A→ A A, A→ B |=DF/SS B
|=DF/TT A→ A A, A→ B 6|=DF/TT B
DF/(SS∩ TT) fails both the Identity Law (A → A) and Modus Ponens: the first
because DF/SS has no sentential validities (as is the case in the Strong Kleene logic
SK/SS), the second because Modus Ponens is not valid in DF/TT (as is the case for
the material conditional in Priest’s LP = SK/TT). As a result, the logic DF/(SS∩ TT)
ends up being very weak.
Consider now the so-called “mixed consequence” schemes, namely TS and ST,
in which the level of truth varies from premises to conclusion (Cobreros et al. 2012).
DF/TS squares well with the degrees of assertability defined in Section 2 since
Ast(A) ≤ Ast(B) for all underlying probability functions if and only if either A and B
are logically equivalent, or A |=TS B (Cantwell 2006, 166). Hence, the logic connects
well to epistemology, and it also eschews the conjunction- and converse-conditional
fallacies. Unfortunately, Modus Ponens and the Identity Law fail (like other senten-
tial validities), not to mention other oddities of the logic, in which A 6|=DF/TS A. In
DF/ST, on the other hand, Modus Ponens and the Identity Law are retained, but also
the entailment of the conditional to conjunction and to its converse remain.
We may summarize these observations in the form of a trilemma:
Fact 3.4. Irrespective of whether SS,TT, ST,TS, SS∩ TT is chosen for validity, a logic on
(L→, f→DF)must either (1) fail Modus Ponens; or (2) fail the Identity Law (and other sentential
validities); or (3) validate the inference from a conditional to its converse.
The trilemma at a glance:
DF/· MP Identity → |=←
SS X × X
TT × X ×
ST X X X
TS × × ×
SS∩ TT × × ×
Ideal case X X ×
The interest of this trilemma is that it involves schemata that depend on no other
connective than the conditional. In what follows, we explore two main ways out of the
trilemma: both select TT validity as comparatively the best choice for validity, but the
second moreover involves a modification of the de Finetti table so as to restore Modus
Ponens.
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4 Giving up Modus Ponens: DF/TT
Given that no validity scheme satisfies the three desiderata of making the DF condi-
tional validate Modus Ponens, avoid the entailment to its converse, and validity the
Identity Law, one way out of the trilemma is to follow Quine 1970’s maxim of “mini-
mum mutilation”, and to elect as optimal the scheme or schemes that violate the fewer
of those constraints.15
Three of the schemes violate two constraints, but DF/TT and DF/ST violate only
one. However, DF/ST badly overgenerates (by validating the entailment to the con-
verse), whereas DF/TT mildly undergenerates (by failing Modus Ponens, but still
satisfying Conditional Introduction, see below). Arguably therefore, DF/TT appears
to be the less inadequate of all options: it retains the Identity Law and avoids the
entailment to the converse conditional, only at the expense of losing Modus Ponens—
a principle that is given up in other logics such as Priest’s LP (i.e., SK/TT) for the
material conditional.16
Two more facts are worth highlighting about DF/TT. Firstly, despite the failure of
Modus Ponens, the conditional supports Conditional Introduction, namely Γ, A |= B
implies Γ |= A → B. In DF/SS, the situation is reversed, since Conditional Introduc-
tion fails despite Modus Ponens holding. Secondly, DF/TT supports full commutation
of the conditional with negation, a schema widely regarded as plausible in natural lan-
guage (see Cooper 1968; Cantwell 2008, and Section 4.1 below).
Fact 4.1. For every {Γ, A, B} ⊆ For:
Conditional Introduction If Γ, A |=DF/TT B, then Γ |=DF/TT A→ B.
Commutation with Negation ¬(A→ B) ≡DF/TT A→ ¬B.
Proof.
- Suppose Γ 6|=DF/TT A → B. Then there exists a DF-evaluation v such that for
all C ∈ Γ, v(C) > 0, but v(A → B) = 0. Hence v(A) = 1, and v(B) = 0, and
Γ, A 6|=DF/TT B.
- Consider any DF-evaluation v such that v(A → ¬B) = 0. Then v(A) = 1,
v(¬B) = 0, so v(B) = 1, and v(A → B) = 1, hence v(¬(A → B)) = 0, and the
converse entailments hold.
Despite blocking the entailment to the converse conditional, DF/TT validates sev-
eral sentential schemata that are intuitively controversial. Farrell (1979) for example
15As in Optimality Theory (see Prince and Smolensky 2008), we also assume that constraints can be
rank-ordered in terms of how their comparative importance. We don’t state the ordering explicitly here,
the discussion makes it clear enough.
16Note that unlike McGee’s logic (McGee 1989), which fails Modus Ponens for complex conditionals,
DF/TT can fail Modus Ponens for simple conditionals, composed of atomic sentences.
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points out that it validates the problematic schema (B ∧ (A → B)) → A, a sentential
version of the fallacy of affirming the antecedent. More generally, we have:
Fact 4.2. For every A, B ∈ For:
|=DF/TT (A→ B)→ A
Proof. For the principle to fail, there must be a DF-evaluation v such that v(A→ B) = 1
and v(A) = 0. But then v(A→ B) = 1/2, contradiction.
Given the conditions the de Finetti conditional puts on TT-validity, however, this
schema does not necessarily constitute an unwelcome prediction. Firstly, it does not
hold in argument form (that is, A → B 6|=TT A), consistently with the fact that TT-
validity does not satisfy Modus Ponens. Secondly, consider the left-nested conditional
sentence:
(2) If Peter visits if Mary visits, then Mary will visit [indeed].
This seems intuitively acceptable, in line with the suppositional reading of the condi-
tional.
The upshot is that DF/TT loses some classical inferences based on the conditional
(like Modus Ponens), and introduces some conditional sentences as validities that are
not classical (viz. Fact 4.2), though not necessarily problematic under a suppositional
reading.
If, on the other hand, we wish to retain Modus Ponens as a central property of
the conditional along with the Identity Law, then the trilemma presented in Fact 3.4
implies that either some further notion of validity must be sought for the de Finetti condi-
tional, or the de Finetti conditional itself is not adequate. However, we have already argued
that the notions of validity considered in this section exhaust the most natural and
well-motivated class of monotonic notions of consequence defined over trivalent eval-
uations. For this reason, in the next section we explore that second option and explore
alternatives to the de Finetti conditional.
5 Retaining Modus Ponens: CC/TT
In this section, we show that under a TT-definition of validity, de Finetti’s table can be
modified, and his motivations preserved, so as to preserveModus Ponens and to avoid
the previous trilemma. We first isolate the class of what we call Jeffrey conditionals.
Within that class, we discuss some reasons to favor the Cooper-Cantwell conditional.
5.1 Jeffrey conditionals
In a short and underappreciated note, Jeffrey (1963) highlighted the following condi-
tion for a trivalent operator to satisfy Modus Ponens when TT is used for validity:
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Fact 5.1. Under a TT-notion of validity, a trivalent conditional operator f→ validates Modus
Ponens only if f→(1, 0) = f→(1/2, 0) = 0.
Proof. Assume f→(1, 0) 6= 0 or f→(1/2, 0) 6= 0. Then it is possible to have v(A) >
0, v(A→ B) > 0 and v(B) = 0, which invalidates Modus Ponens.
We may therefore call a conditional operator Jeffrey if it extends the bivalent “gappy”
conditional as follows (Jeffrey 1963):
Definition 5.2. A Jeffrey conditional is any binary trivalent operator of the form:
f→ 1 1/2 0
1 1 d1 0
1/2 d2 d3 0
0 1/2 d4 1/2
where di ∈ {1/2, 1} for 1 ≤ i ≤ 4.17
An operator can therefore satisfy Jeffrey’s constraint and be de Finettian at the
same time, namely comply with the truth conditions of de Finetti’s conditional when
the antecedent has a classical truth value (see Definition 2.1). We thus say that:
Fact 5.3. A Jeffrey conditional is de Finettian provided it is of the form:
f→ 1 1/2 0
1 1 1/2 0
1/2 d2 d3 0
0 1/2 1/2 1/2
where d2, d3 ∈ {1/2, 1}.
Clearly, there exist four de Finettian Jeffrey conditionals (see Figure 5). Two of them
are the Cooper-Cantwell (CC) and the Farrell conditional (F). We call the other two J1
and J2. For each such table, we modify the notion of DF-evaluation accordingly (call
it a CC-, F-, J1-, and J2-evaluation respectively).
It is straightforward to see that Jeffrey conditionals (whether de Finettian or not)
eschew the trilemma faced by de Finetti’s:
Proposition 5.4 (Trilemma Resolution). Under a TT-notion of validity, any Jeffrey condi-
tional
- satisfies Modus Ponens and the Identity Law;
17Jeffrey contends that any completion of the gappy truth table must satisfy this schema; to prove this
claim he demands that any acceptable logic satisfy Modus Ponens, Syllogism, the Deduction Theorem
and Contraposition. His argument depends on choosing a negation operator mapping designated values
under the TT-scheme to a nondesignated value, and conversely (for more details on this connection, see
Chemla and Égré 2019a).
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f→CC 1 1/2 0
1 1 1/2 0
1/2 1 1/2 0
0 1/2 1/2 1/2
f→F 1 1/2 0
1 1 1/2 0
1/2 1/2 1/2 0
0 1/2 1/2 1/2
f→J2 1 1/2 0
1 1 1/2 0
1/2 1 1 0
0 1/2 1/2 1/2
f→J1 1 1/2 0
1 1 1/2 0
1/2 1/2 1 0
0 1/2 1/2 1/2
Figure 5: The de Finettian Jeffrey conditionals
- invalidates the entailment of the conditional to its converse.
Proof.
- Modus Ponens: Assume v(A) > 0 and v(A→ B) > 0, then clearly v(B) > 0.
- Identity: All values on the diagonal of any Jeffrey conditional differ from 0.
- Avoiding the entailment to the converse: When v(A) = 0 and v(B) = 1/2, v(A→
B) > 0 but v(B → A) = 0: this invalidates the entailment from A→ B to B→ A.
Like de Finetti’s conditional, all Jeffrey conditionals TT-validate Conditional Intro-
duction, but unlike the de Finetti conditional they satisfy the converse, namely the full
Deduction Theorem. In fact, there is a precise sense in which TT-validity and Jeffrey
conditionals fit each other:18
Proposition 5.5 (Deduction Theorem).
Any Jeffrey conditional TT-validates both directions of the Deduction Theorem, that is for every
J-evaluation,
Γ, A |=J/TT B if and only if Γ |=J/TT A→ B (Deduction Theorem)
No Jeffrey conditional validates the full Deduction Theorem for SS-, TT∩ SS, ST and TS-
validity.
Proof.
18Compare with Chemla and Égré (2019a), who examine which conditionals of a specific form are
admitted by a given consequence relation in trivalent and higher-valued logic. Here we partly reverse
this problem, by looking at which validity scheme, if any, is most appropriate to a given conditional
operator.
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Deduction Theorem for TT-validity:
(⇒) Suppose Γ 6|=J/TT A → B. Then there is some J-evaluation v such that for
all C ∈ Γ, v(C) > 0 but v(A) > 0 and v(B) = 0. This implies that Γ, A 6|=J/TT B.
(⇐) Suppose Γ, A 6|=J/TT B: there there is some J-evaluation v such that for
all C ∈ Γ, v(C) > 0, v(A) > 0, but v(B) = 0. Hence, v(A → B) = 0, and
Γ 6|=J/TT A→ B.
Failure of Deduction Theorem for SS-, ST-, SS∩ TT-, and TS-validity:
(⇐) For SS-validity and failure of the Deduction Theorem, consider v(A) = 1/2
and v(B) = 0. Then the Jeffrey conditional A → B is false, but the entailment
A |=SS B holds. The same case shows failure of the Deduction Theorem for ST-
validity. For SS∩ TT- and TS-validity, consider the case v(A) = 0 and v(B) = 1.
This result is important since our consequence relation is meant to capture a suit-
able logic of suppositional reasoning, in line with de Finetti’s original motivation. Just as
the truth table for the trivalent conditional is motivated by the idea of evaluating the
consequent under the supposition of the antecedent, the consequence relation should
describe the inferences that are licensed by supposing the antecedent. Therefore, a
deduction theorem is an important adequacy condition for a logic of trivalent condi-
tionals, making a strong case for TT-validity in combination with Jeffrey conditionals.
Relatedly, it can be seen that no Jeffrey conditional supports (A → B) → A as a valid
schema relative to TT-validity (to see this, let v(A) = 0, v(B) = 1/2), unlike de Finetti’s
conditional (see Fact 4.2 and compare Farrell 1979, whose motivation for→F lies pre-
cisely here). Finally, we saw that relative to TT-validity de Finetti’s conditional is
logically equivalent to the material conditional. By contrast, every Jeffrey conditional
relative to that same scheme is strictly stronger than the material conditional. Relative
to TT-validity, Jeffrey conditionals do not fall prey to Gibbard’s collapse result, basi-
cally because they do not support Gibbard’s condition (ii): when A classically entails
C, A→ C need not be valid.
5.2 Negation and CC/TT
To choose between the various Jeffrey conditionals, we suggest to look at the interplay
of the conditional with the other logical connectives. The interplay between condi-
tional and negation is especially relevant, since several of the most debated principles
involving indicative conditionals concern negation as well. One common fact about
Jeffrey conditionals is that they fail contraposition relative to Strong Kleene negation:
Proposition 5.6. For any Jeffrey conditional, A→ B 6|=J/TT ¬B → ¬A.
Proof. Suppose v(A) = 1, v(B) = 1/2. Then v(A → B) = 1/2, but v(¬B → ¬A) = 0.
Hence, A→ B 6|=J/TT ¬B → ¬A.
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The failure of Contraposition may be seen as a welcome prediction. First of all,
supposing A and supposing ¬B are just two different things. For example, when
v(A) = v(B) = 1, then A → B is obviously true, whereas ¬B → ¬A is now
“void”—the conditions for evaluating its truth or falsity are not satisfied. Therefore
v(¬B → ¬A) = 1/2. Second, contraposition does not always preserve meaning. The
contrapositive of a sentence like “if Sappho did not die in 570 BC, then she is dead by
now” would be “if Sappho is not dead by now, then she died in 570 BC”. The latter
obviously conveys a different thought. Hence the inference to the contrapositive is
not warranted in all situations.19 Since all Jeffrey conditionals satisfy the deduction
theorem relative to TT-validity, this means they also fail to validate Modus Tollens.
Modus Tollens is not DF/TT-valid either, though Contraposition is.
On the other hand, as noted by Cooper (1968) and Cantwell (2008), the Cooper-
Cantwell conditional supports the full commutation of Strong Kleene negation with
the conditional, namely the logical equivalence between ¬(A → B) and (A → ¬B).20
In fact, it is the only Jeffrey conditional that does so:
Proposition 5.7. Among all Jeffrey conditionals, only the Cooper-Cantwell conditional val-
idates the full commutation schema for negation. For de Finettian Jeffrey conditionals, in
particular, SK-negation is a separating connective:
J = · ¬(A→ B) |=J/TT A→ ¬B A→ ¬B |=J/TT ¬(A→ B)
CC X X
F × X
J1 × ×
J2 X ×
Proof. From the definition of a Jeffrey conditional in Definition 5.2, the truth tables for
¬(A→ B) and A→ ¬B look like this:
¬(A→ B) 1 1/2 0
1 0 ¬d1 1
1/2 ¬d2 ¬d3 1
0 1/2 ¬d4 1/2
A→ ¬B 1 1/2 0
1 0 d1 1
1/2 0 d3 d2
0 1/2 d4 1/2
For TT-entailment to go in both directions, necessarily, ¬d2 = 0, hence d2 = 1, and
d1, d3, d4 must all equal 1/2, which yields the table for the Cooper-Cantwell conditional.
For the other de Finettian Jeffrey cases: let v be an F-evaluation, or a J1-evaluation:
assume v(A) = 1/2 and v(B) = 1, then v(¬(A → B)) = 1/2), but v(A → ¬B) = 0.
Let v be a J1-evaluation, or a J2-evaluation: assume v(A) = 1/2 and v(B) = 1/2, then
19Of course, we are assuming double negation elimination inside conditionals—this seems entirely
unproblematic. Accounts where Contraposition holds, such as the refined material conditional view of
Jackson (1979, 1987), have to go to some length to explain away the counterintuitive feel of such examples.
20Prof. Farrell (p.c.) draws our attention to the fact that his table supports full commutation for condi-
tionals involving atomic sentences, when restricted to atom-classical valuations. Because the restriction to
atom-classical valuations is defended by Cooper, the two accounts mostly differ on nested conditionals.
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v(A → ¬B) = 1, but v(¬(A → B)) = 0. Consider any J2-evaluation. To show that
¬(A → B) |= A → ¬B, assume that there is a v such that v(A → ¬B) = 0, but
v(¬(A → B)) > 0. Necessarily, v(A) > 0, but v(¬B) = 0, so v(B) = 1. But then
v(A→ B) = 1, and v(¬(A→ B)) = 0, contradiction.
In classical logic, only the commutation from outer to inner negation is valid. On
the other hand, inferences in natural language appear to support both directions in
many contexts. Ramsey (1929), Adams (1965), Cooper (1968), Cantwell (2008) and
Francez (2016) give a theoretically motivated defense of the commutation scheme,
while the studies by Handley, Evans, and Thompson (2006) and Politzer (2009) pro-
vide some empirical support. See, however, Égré and Politzer (2013), Olivier (2018)
and Skovgaard-Olsen, Collins, Krzyz˙anowska, Hahn, and Klauer (2019) for a more
complex picture.
5.3 Connexivity
We conclude this section by briefly relating our discussion of the TT-logics of de
Finettian and Jeffrey conditionals to a slightly wider logical context. A conditional
logic is called connexive if it validates the two following schemata:
¬(¬A→ A) (Aristotle’s Thesis)
and
(A→ C)→ ¬(A→ ¬C) (Boethius’ Thesis)
(see Pizzi 1977; Wansing 2016). Both de Finetti’s conditional and the Cooper-Cantwell
conditional are connexive when paired with TT-validity (and Strong Kleene nega-
tion).21 Neither Aristotle’s Thesis nor Boethius’ Thesis are classical tautologies: in-
deed, connexive logics are not subsystems of classical logic.22 On the other hand,
systems of connexive logic lack some classical principle, lest they are trivial (of course,
DF/TT and CC/TT are no exception). Informally construed, Aristotle’s Thesis requires
that it is never the case that a formula is implied by its own negation, while Boethius’
Thesis requires that if a conditional A → C holds, then it is not the case that the
conditional that results from the former by negating the consequent, i.e. A → ¬C
(which is equivalent to the negated conditional ¬(A→ C) in both DF/TT and CC/TT)
hold. Now, since both DF/TT and CC/TT employ a tolerant-tolerant notion of va-
lidity, the fact that they satisfy Boethius’ Thesis can hardly be interpreted as saying
that they show that a conditional is ‘incompatible’ with its negation (and similarly
for Aristotle’s Thesis). Nevertheless, in requiring such a strict, extra-classical connec-
tion between antecedent and consequent of a conditional, connexive logics—including
DF/TT and CC/TT—arguably ensure that the conditional interacts reasonably well
with negation.
21Kapsner 2018 is a recent paper that restates de Finetti’s table specifically in relation to connexivity.
22Classical counterexamples are easily obtained by assigning value 1 to A in Aristotle’s Thesis, and
value 0 in Boethius’ Thesis.
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Nevertheless, the interaction of conditional and negation displayed by connexive
logics of De Finettian and Jeffrey conditionals, DF/TT and CC/TT in particular, is not
entirely free from worries. For one thing, connexivity comes at a price when it comes
to reductio proofs (see Cooper 1968 for discussion). For another, like de Finetti’s
conditional, the Cooper-Cantwell conditional also validates the following equivalence,
where ≡m is the material biconditional:
¬(A→ B) ≡m (A→ ¬B)
As a consequence, both conditionals validate
Conditional Excluded Middle |=·/TT (A→ B) ∨ (A→ ¬B)
Conditional Excluded Middle is a moot principle, but it is a natural one to have if
negation is to commute with the conditional.23 Moreover, since every de Finettian
Jeffrey conditional validates Conditional Excluded Middle, this does not tell against
the Cooper-Cantwell variant. Thanks to the fact that it is the only one, within the
de Finettian Jeffrey conditionals, to support the full commutation with negation, the
Cooper-Cantwell conditional stands out as the closest to de Finetti’s original connec-
tive.
6 Comparisons and Limits
We have distinguished two trivalents logics of indicative conditionals, namely DF/TT
and CC/TT, whose proof theory and algebraic semantics we will explore in Part II
of this paper. Before doing so, let us summarize the commonalities between the two
logics, their principal differences, and draw comparisons with other logics of condi-
tionals.
Four main features are common to DF/TT and CC/TT: they are truth-functional
logics, they share the same de Finettian semantic core, they are connexive, and both
support the law of Import-Export without restriction. The main difference between
DF/TT and CC/TT is that the former fails Modus Ponens, whereas the latter pre-
serves it, so that only CC/TT supports the full Deduction Theorem. This property
is in line with the fact that for TT-validity, the designated values are 1 and 1/2, and
the Cooper-Cantwell conditional is only evaluated as false when the antecedent is
designated and the consequent undesignated. Conversely, relative to Strong Kleene
negation the Cooper-Cantwell conditional fails Contraposition, whereas de Finetti’s
conditional supports Contraposition, but both fails Modus Tollens.
The preservation of Modus Ponens may be seen as virtue of CC/TT compared
to DF/TT. However, one common fact about both logics, given our assumption that
they share the same Strong Kleene disjunction, is that they fail the rule of Disjunctive
Syllogism (¬A, A ∨ B |= B). Clearly, this concerns the table for disjunction for a TT-
consequence relation (see Priest 1979; Cantwell 2008), independently of the particular
truth conditions for the conditional.
23For a criticism of Conditional Excluded Middle, see Lewis (1973), for a defense see Stalnaker (1980).
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Because the Law of Import-Export is validated, in both CC/TT and DF/TT only one
of the paradoxes of material implication is blocked, namely the schema A → (¬A →
B). On the other hand, A → (B → A) holds in both logics, consistent with the fact
that A∧ B→ A is valid. As discussed in Section 4, this property squares well with the
proposed suppositional interpretation of the conditional. Given the way conjunction
and disjunction are handled in DF/TT and CC/TT, we can therefore conclude that
whereas both logics are connexive, neither is relevantist, except in a weak sense (by
failing one of the paradoxes of material implication).
We now discuss some limitations of our logics. First, both CC/TT and DF/TT
validate the so-called Linearity principle (A → B) ∨ (B → A). This schema was
famously criticized by MacColl (1908), who pointed out that neither of “if John is red-
haired, then John is a doctor” and “if John is a doctor, then he is red-haired” seems
acceptable in ordinary reasoning.
Second, there is a certain tension between our extensional semantics of condition-
als and the intensional use to which they are often put. Suppose Mary believes the
following conditional:
(3) If the Church is East of the City Hall, then the City Hall is West of the Church
Intuitively the proposition that Mary believes appears analytically true. Nonetheless,
on the de Finettian analysis its truth value depends on the position of the City Hall
with respect to the Church: the conditional may be evaluated either as true or as inde-
terminate. The apparent analyticity of (3) has to be explained by reference to it being
maximally assertable, regardless of its actual truth value. In fact, also Lewis (1986,
315) observes that “there is a discrepancy between truth- and assertability-preserving
inference involving indicative conditionals; and that our intuitions about valid reason-
ing with conditionals are apt to concern the latter, and so to be poor evidence about
the former.” In other words, while DF/TT and CC/TT aim at describing a logic of
suppositional reasoning and their analysis of (3) should be evaluated by these crite-
ria, reasonable inferences with conditionals, including “apparent analytic truths”, may
need to be analyzed in terms of a (probabilistic) theory of assertability. This theory can
again be anchored in, and motivated by, trivalent truth conditions for conditionals—
see Section 2. Detailing the division of labor between semantics (truth conditions,
validity) and epistemology (degrees of assertability) is, however, a project for future
work.
Third, some conjunctive sentences can never be true on DF/TT or CC/TT, because
one of the conjuncts will always be indeterminate. An “obvious truth” such as (A →
A) ∧ (¬A → ¬A) is always classified as indeterminate (we are indebted to Paolo
Santorio for this example). Likewise, a “partitioning sentence” of the form (A→ B) ∧
(¬A → C) will always be indeterminate or false (Bradley 2002, 368–370). However, a
sentence such as:
(4) If the sun shines tomorrow, John goes to the beach; and if it rains, he goes to
the museum.
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seems to be true (with hindsight) if the sun shines tomorrow and John goes indeed to
the beach.
Both cases raise a challenge for an account of the assertability of compound condi-
tionals. An attempt to deal with them may be to extend the assertability principle A to
sentences of arbitrary logical complexity, and to stipulate logical validities to have de-
gree of assertability 1. This would make (A→ A)∧ (¬A→ ¬A)maximally assertable.
However, it would remain silent on the assertability of Bradley-type sentences. For the
latter, an unrestricted version of A would predict the degree of assertability to be 0
(since Bradley’s sentence must be false when its truth value is classical), obviously a
bad prediction. Because of that, principle A may indeed have to be restricted to non-
compound conditionals, and a full account of assertability for compound sentences
may have to be a recursive account, based on the assertability of simpler sentences.24
A possibly more elegant way of overcoming these limitations, proposed by Cooper
(1968), is to introduce different truth tables for trivalent conjunction and disjunction—
see Table 6 (see also Humberstone 2011, 1044–1053). These truth tables, where the
conjunction of the true and the indeterminate is the true (and vice versa for disjunc-
tion), can be motivated by the isomorphism between bets and truth values introduced
in Section 2: a system of bets should be classified as winning if it consists of a winning
and a called-off bet. Adopting this quasi-conjunction and quasi-disjunction, invali-
dates Linearity and resolves the problem with the truth and assertability conditions
of partitioning sentences. In particular, (A → A) ∧ (¬A → ¬A) is always true, and
so is (A → B) ∧ (¬A → C) when its first conjunct is true. However, when paired
with DF/TT, quasi-conjunction leads to a violation of Import-Export; so it should be
considered only as a possible modification of CC/TT.
f ′∧ 1 1/2 0
1 1 1 0
1/2 1 1/2 0
0 0 0 0
f ′∨ 1 1/2 0
1 1 1 1
1/2 1 1/2 0
0 1 0 0
Figure 6: Truth tables for trivalent quasi-conjunction and quasi-disjunction, as advo-
cated by Cooper (1968).
On a general level, quasi-disjunction violates Disjunction Introduction (A |= A∨ B,
and quasi-conjunction the dual inference from ¬A to ¬(A ∧ B)), but this feature is
in line with a relevantist solution to the paradoxes of material implication. More
surprising is perhaps that the material conditional ¬A ∨ C is now logically stronger
than the indicative conditional A → C—a feature that needs closer analysis. On the
positive side, the two connectives in Table 6 are dual to each other and thus satisfy
the de Morgan rules. Conjunction Elimination (A ∧ B |= A) still holds for CC/TT, and
24For example, both for Bradley’s example, and for Santorio’s example, the assertability of each con-
junction is better predicted if thought of as the minimum of the assertability of each conjunct as predicted
by principle A. We leave an elaboration of that idea for further work.
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so do most other desirable principles (e.g., Import-Export, Distributivity, Conditional
Excluded Middle). The results of Section 5—the classification of Jeffrey conditionals,
the Deduction Theorem, commutation with negation, the connexive principles—also
stay intact since they do not depend on the choice of the connective for conjunction
and disjunction. An additional benefit of operating with quasi-disjunction instead
of Strong Kleene disjunction is the validation of the rule of Disjunctive Syllogism in
CC/TT (¬A, A ∨ B |= B). Ultimately, the choice between these two versions of CC/TT
is up to the reader, dependent on how they weigh the distinctive features of the two
resulting logics. In any case, quasi-conjunction and -disjunction offer a principled way
of responding to philosophically minded objections that have long plagued advocates
of trivalent semantics for indicative conditionals.
7 Summary and Perspectives
De Finetti’s trivalent conditional was put forward by de Finetti to qualitatively model
the way in which conditional statements are probabilistically represented. Since its
discovery, the DF table has received a fair amount of attention from mathematicians
as well as psychologists, but there have been surprisingly few investigations of the
trivalent logics supported by the conditional as well as the variants in its vicinity. Our
main motivation for this paper has been to fill this gap.
We started with the observation that de Finetti’s truth table faces a trilemma when
confronted with the choice of a trivalent validity relation: give up the Identity Law
and other sentential validities, support the entailment from a conditional to its con-
verse, or give up Modus Ponens. We have argued that the latter option is the less
costly in relation to its alternatives, if the DF conditional is paired with a notion of
TT-validity. On the other hand, trivalent Jeffrey conditionals, which have the prop-
erty f→(1/2, 0) = 0, avoid this trilemma when endowedwith the same TT-consequence
relation: they block the entailment to the converse conditionals, they support the Iden-
tity Law, and moreover they support the full Deduction Theorem (Modus Ponens and
Conditional Introduction), in line with the fact that the values 1 and 1/2 are designated
for consequence, and pattern in the same way for those conditionals.
Zooming in on Jeffrey conditionals, we see that the Cooper-Cantwell conditional
stands out in that it satisfies the full commutation schema for negation, a schema
widely regarded as plausible in natural language, also supported by the de Finetti
conditional. Prima facie therefore, the Cooper-Cantwell conditional appears to strike
the best balance between logical and epistemological properties: like Farrell’s condi-
tional, but unlike de Finetti’s, it satisfies Modus Ponens. Its motivation for the middle
line of its truth table—to treat an indeterminate antecedent like a true one—is more
stringent than Farrell’s, and well-aligned with the TT-consequence relation.
As pointed out in the previous section, both CC/TT and DF/TT share features
which may be seen as problematic, such as the Linearity principle and the treatment
of partitioning sentences. A principled way out of these problems that merits further
attention is to modify CC/TT by changing the connectives for conjunction and disjunc-
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tion along the lines of Cooper 1968. From a methodological point of view, however, we
think it matters to any further work on conditionals to locate exactly the (actual and
alleged) limits of the trivalent approach, in particular because they should be carefully
compared to some of the benefits we highlighted. In Part II of this paper, we therefore
propose a more elaborate treatment of the proof theory and algebraic semantics of
both CC/TT and DF/TT, in order to give a more informed assessment of both logics.
24
References
Adams, Ernest W. (1965). The Logic of Conditionals. Inquiry 8, 166–197.
Adams, Ernest W. (1975). The Logic of Conditionals. Dordrecht: Reidel.
Baratgin, Jean, David Over, and Guy Politzer (2013). Uncertainty and the de Finetti tables.
Thinking & Reasoning 19, 308–328.
Beaver, David and Emiel Krahmer (2001). A partial account of presupposition projection.
Journal of Logic, Language and Information 10, 147.
Belnap, Nuel D. (1970). Conditional assertion and restricted quantification. Noûs, 1–12.
Blamey, Stephen (1986). Partial logic. In D. Gabbay and F. Guentner (eds.), Handbook of philo-
sophical logic, Volume 3, pp. 1–70. Springer.
Bochvar, D. A. (1937). [On a three-valued calculus and its applications to the paradoxes of
the classical extended functional calculus]. Mathematicheskii sbornik 4, 287–308. English
translation by M. Bergmann in History and Philosophy of Logic 2 (1981), 87–112.
Bradley, Richard (2002). Indicative conditionals. Erkenntnis 56, 345–378.
Cantwell, John (2006). The laws of non-bivalent probability. Logic and Logical Philosophy 15,
163–171.
Cantwell, John (2008). The logic of conditional negation. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 49,
245–260.
Chemla, Emmanuel and Paul Égré (2019a). From many-valued consequence to many-valued
connectives. Synthese. In press.
Chemla, Emmanuel and Paul Égré (2019b). Suszko’s thesis: Mixed consequence and composi-
tionality. Review of Symbolic Logic. Forthcoming.
Chemla, Emmanuel, Paul Égré, and Benjamin Spector (2017). Characterizing logical conse-
quence in many-valued logic. Journal of Logic and Computation 27, 2193–2226.
Cobreros, Pablo, Paul Égré, David Ripley, and Robert van Rooij (2012). Tolerant, classical,
strict. Journal of Philosophical Logic 41, 347–85.
Cobreros, Pablo, Paul Egré, David Ripley, and Robert van Rooij (2015). Vagueness, truth and
permissive consequence. In D. Achouriotti, H. Galinon, and J. Martinez (eds.), Unifying the
Philosophy of Truth, pp. 409–430. Springer.
Cooper, William S. (1968). The propositional logic of ordinary discourse. Inquiry 11, 295–320.
de Finetti, Bruno (1936). La logique de la probabilité. In Actes du congrès international de
philosophie scientifique, Volume 4, pp. 1–9. Hermann Editeurs Paris.
Douven, Igor (2016). The Epistemology of Indicative Conditionals. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.
Douven, Igor and Sara Verbrugge (2010). The Adams family. Cognition 117, 302–318.
Dubois, Didier and Henri Prade (1994). Conditional objects as nonmonotonic consequence
relationships. IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics 24, 1724–1740.
Edgington, Dorothy (1995). On Conditionals. Mind 104, 235–329.
Égré, Paul and Mikaël Cozic (2011). If-clauses and probability operators. Topoi 30, 17.
25
Égré, Paul and Mikaël Cozic (2016). Conditionals. In Maria Aloni and Paul Dekker (eds.), The
Cambridge Handbook of Formal Semantics, pp. 678–724. Cambridge University Press.
Égré, Paul and Guy Politzer (2013). On the negation of indicative conditionals. In Proceedings
of the 19th Amsterdam Colloquium, pp. 10–18.
Evans, Jonathan, Simon Handley, Helen Neilens, and David Over (2007). Thinking about
conditionals: A study of individual differences. Memory & Cognition 35, 1772–1784.
Farrell, Robert J. (1979). Material implication, confirmation, and counterfactuals. Notre Dame
Journal of Formal Logic 20, 383–394.
Farrell, Robert J. (1986). Implication and presupposition. Notre Dame journal of formal logic 27,
51–61.
Francez, Nissim (2016). Natural deduction for two connexive logics. IFCoLog Journal of Logics
and their Applications 3, 479–504.
Frankowski, Szymon (2004). Formalization of a plausible inference. Bulletin of the Section of
Logic 33, 41–52.
Gibbard, Allan (1980). Two recent theories of conditionals. In William Harper (ed.), Ifs, pp.
211–247. Springer.
Handley, Simon, Jonathan Evans, and Valerie Thompson (2006). The Negated Conditional: A
Litmus Test for the Suppositional Conditional? Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning,
Memory and Cognition 32, 559–569.
Humberstone, Lloyd (2011). The Connectives. MIT Press.
Jackson, Frank (1979). On Assertion and Indicative Conditionals. Philosophical Review 88, 565–
589.
Jackson, Frank (1987). Conditionals. London: Blackwell.
Jeffrey, Richard C. (1963). On indeterminate conditionals. Philosophical Studies 14, 37–43.
Kapsner, Andreas (2018). Humble connexivity. Logic and Logical Philosophy. In press.
Khoo, Justin (2015). On indicative and subjunctive conditionals. Philosopher’s Imprint 15.
Kneale, William and Martha Kneale (1962). The development of logic. Oxford University Press.
Krzyzanowska, Karolina (2015). Between “If” and “Then”. Towards an empirically informed philos-
ophy of conditionals. PhD thesis, University of Groningen.
Lewis, David (1973). Counterfactuals. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Lewis, David (1986). Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Łukasiewicz, Jan (1920). [On three-valued logic]. Ruch Filosoficzny 5, 70–71. English translation
in J. Łukasiewicz, Selected Works, L. Borkowski ed., 1970.
MacColl, Hugh (1908). ’if’and’imply’. Mind 17, 453–455.
Malinowski, Grzegorz (1990). Q-consequence operation. Reports on mathematical logic 24, 49–54.
Mandelkern, Matthew (forthcoming). Import-Export and ‘And’. Philosophy and Phenomenologi-
cal Research.
Manor, Ruth (1975). Propositional commitment and presuppositions. American Philosophical
Quarterly 12, 141–149.
26
McDermott, Michael (1996). On the truth conditions of certain ‘if’-sentences. The Philosophical
Review 105, 1–37.
McGee, Vann (1985). A counterexample to modus ponens. The Journal of Philosophy 82, 462–71.
McGee, Vann (1989). Conditional probabilities and compounds of conditionals. The Philosoph-
ical Review 98, 485–541.
Milne, Peter (1997). Bruno de Finetti and the logic of conditional events. The British Journal for
the Philosophy of Science 48, 195–232.
Olivier, François (2018). Les énoncés conditionnels et la négation. Master’s Thesis, Paris, Ecole
normale supérieure.
Over, David (2016). Causation and the probability of causal conditionals. In MichaelWaldmann
(ed.), Oxford Handbook of Causal Reasoning. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Over, David and Jean Baratgin (2017). The “defective” truth table. In Niall Galbraith, Erica
Lucas, and David Over (eds.), The Thinking Mind: A Festschrift for Ken Manktelow, pp. 15–28.
Routledge.
Over, David, Constantinos Hadjichristidis, Jonathan Evans, Simon Handley, and Steven Sloman
(2007). The probability of causal conditionals. Cognitive Psychology 54, 62–97.
Pizzi, Claudio (1977). Boethius’ thesis and conditional logic. Journal of Philosophical Logic 6,
283–302.
Politzer, Guy (2009). Could it be the case that if I am right my opponents will be pleased? a
rejoinder to Johnson-Laird, Byrne and Girotto. Topoi 28, 81–85.
Priest, Graham (1979). The logic of paradox. Journal of Philosophical Logic 8, 219–241.
Prince, Alan and Paul Smolensky (2008). Optimality Theory: Constraint interaction in generative
grammar. John Wiley & Sons.
Quine, W. V. O. (1950). Methods of Logic. Harvard University Press.
Quine, W. V. O. (1970). Philosophy of Logic. Harvard University Press.
Ramsey, Frank P. (1926). Truth and Probability. In D H Mellor (ed.), Philosophical Papers, pp.
52–94. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ramsey, Frank P. (1929). General Propositions and Causality. In D H Mellor (ed.), Philosophical
Papers, pp. 237–257. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Reichenbach, Hans (1935). Wahrscheinlichkeitslehre. Sijthoff Leiden.
Reichenbach, Hans (1944). Philosophic foundations of quantum mechanics. University of California
Press.
Rothschild, Daniel (2014). Capturing the relationship between conditionals and conditional
probability with a trivalent semantics. Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 24, 144–152.
Skovgaard-Olsen, Niels, Peter Collins, Karolina Krzyz˙anowska, Ulrike Hahn, and
Karl Christoph Klauer (2019). Cancellation, negation, and rejection. Cognitive psychology 108,
42–71.
Skovgaard-Olsen, Niels, Henrik Singmann, and Karl Christoph Klauer (2016). The relevance
effect and conditionals. Cognition 150, 26 – 36.
Spohn, Wolfgang (2013). A ranking-theoretic approach to conditionals. Cognitive Science 37,
1074–1106.
27
Stalnaker, Robert (1968). A Theory of Conditionals. In Studies in Logical Theory: American
Philosophical Quarterly Monograph Series, No. 2. Oxford: Blackwell.
Stalnaker, Robert (1975). Indicative Conditionals. Philosophia 5, 269–286.
Stalnaker, Robert C. (1980). A defense of conditional excluded middle. In William Harper
(ed.), Ifs, pp. 87–104. Springer.
Wansing, Heinrich (2016). Connexive logic. In Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia
of Philosophy (Spring 2016 ed.). Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.
Zardini, Elia (2008). A model of tolerance. Studia Logica 90, 337–368.
28
ar
X
iv
:1
90
1.
10
26
6v
2 
 [m
ath
.L
O]
  2
6 J
ul 
20
19
De Finettian Logics of Indicative
Conditionals
Part II: Proof Theory and Algebraic Semantics
Paul Égré, Lorenzo Rossi, Jan Sprenger
Abstract
In Part I of this paper, we identified and compared various schemes for triva-
lent truth conditions for indicative conditionals, most notably the proposals by
de Finetti (1936) and Reichenbach (1944) on the one hand, and by Cooper (1968)
and Cantwell (2008) on the other. Here we provide the proof theory for the result-
ing logics DF/TT and CC/TT, using tableau calculi and sequent calculi, and prov-
ing soundness and completeness results. Then we turn to the algebraic semantics,
where both logics have substantive limitations: DF/TT allows for algebraic com-
pleteness, but not for the construction of a canonical model, while CC/TT fails
the construction of a Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra. With these results in mind, we
draw up the balance and sketch future research projects.
In Part I of this paper, we have reviewed the motivations for a trivalent seman-
tic treatment of indicative conditionals, centered on the proposal made by de Finetti
(1936), and Reichenbach (1944), to treat indicative conditionals as conditional asser-
tions akin to conditional bets. We have singled out two de Finettian logics of the
indicative conditional, the first based on de Finetti’s table, paired with a notion of
logical consequence as preservation of non-Falsity (TT-validity), the other based on a
close kin of de Finetti’s table, the Cooper-Cantwell table, paired with the same notion
of validity (Cooper 1968; Cantwell 2008). These logics are called DF/TT and CC/TT,
respectively. We repeat the truth tables of the conditional operator in Figure 1 and the
definition of TT-validity below.
f→DF 1 1/2 0
1 1 1/2 0
1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2
0 1/2 1/2 1/2
f→CC 1 1/2 0
1 1 1/2 0
1/2 1 1/2 0
0 1/2 1/2 1/2
Figure 1: truth tables for the de Finetti conditional (left) and the Cooper-Cantwell
conditional (right).
TT-validity Γ |=X/TT A provided every X-evaluation that makes all sentences of Γ
T-true also makes A T-true. In other words, if for every X-evaluation function
v : For 7−→ {0, 1/2, 1} (where X specifies the interpretation of → and other con-
nectives), for every sentence B ∈ Γ, v(B) ∈ {1/2, 1}, then also v(A) ∈ {1/2, 1}.
As easily seen from the tables, both conditionals are de Finettian in the following
sense: they take the value of the consequent when the antecedent is true (= 1), and
the value indeterminate when the antecedent is false (= 0). They differ when the an-
tecedent itself is indeterminate (= 1/2): whereas the DF conditional groups 1/2 with
0 in antecedent position, the CC conditional groups 1/2 with 1 instead. In both logics
(whether X=DF or CC), the non-conditional connectives ‘¬’, ‘∧’ and ‘∨’ are interpreted
according to the Łukasiewicz/de Finetti/Strong Kleene truth tables, where negation
swaps 1 and 0, mapping 1/2 to itself, and where conjunction and disjunction are inter-
pretable as min and max respectively. Although alternative tables are given in Cooper
(1968) for disjunction and conjunction, in this part as well as in the previous one, our
focus remains on the standard interpretation of the connectives.
In Part I, it was pointed out that the resulting logics DF/TT and CC/TT share
some distinctive features, in particular both satisfy Conditional Introduction and the
law of Import-Export, and both are connexive logics (supporting ¬(A → ¬A) and
the inference from (A → ¬B) to ¬(A → B)). In fact, both support unrestricted
commutation of the conditional with negation. This feature sets them apart from
other de Finettian logics, in particular Farrell (1979)’s and further variants (called de
Finettian-Jeffrey in part I, after Jeffrey 1963).1 However, they differ foremost on Modus
Ponens, which is preserved in CC/TT but given up in DF/TT.
In this second part of our inquiry, we turn to an investigation of the proof theory
of DF/TT and CC/TT. We proceed in three main steps: in Section 1, we give sound
and complete tableaux calculi for either logic; in Section 2, we present sound and
complete sequent calculi; in Section 3, finally, we examine the prospect for an algebraic
semantics for both DF/TT and CC/TT. As we shall see, neither logic admits a ‘nice’
algebraic semantics, but there is a sense in which CC/TT, despite satisfying Modus
Ponens, falls even shorter than DF/TT in that regard. We give a discussion of that
result and further the comparison between both logics in Section 4.
1 Tableau Calculi
In this section, we introduce sound and complete tableau calculi for CC/TT and
DF/TT. Tableau calculi are a proof-theoretical formalism that is very close to the se-
mantics. To prove a sentence, tableaux employ trees that can be conceptualized as
reverse truth tables. In building a tableau, one starts from the assumption that cer-
tain sentences A0, . . . , An have certain semantic values, and iteratively works out all
1As explained in part I, Farrell (1979)’s F-variant differs from the Cooper-Cantwell table just on the
entry (1/2, 1), where it returns the value 1/2: the resulting logic, F/TT, is also connexive, but does not
support full commutation.
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the value assignments to the sub-sentences of A0, . . . , An that result from the initial
assignment. In the propositional case, this process always terminates after a finite
number of steps, resulting in either an open or a closed tableau: in the former case, the
initial assignment is possible according to the chosen semantics, whereas in the latter it
is not. Therefore, in order to prove that A follows from a (finite) set of sentences Γ in a
tableaux system, one shows that all the tableaux resulting from the initial assignments
in which all the sentences in Γ have a designated value but A does not are closed.
1.1 Tableau calculus for CC/TT
The CC/TT tableau calculus, in symbols CC/TTt, is given by the following tableau
construction rules:
¬A : 1
A : 0
¬A : 0
A : 1
¬A : 1/2
A : 1/2
A ∧ B : 1
A : 1 ; B : 1
A ∧ B : 0
B : 0A : 0
A ∧ B : 1/2
A : 1/2 ; B : 1A : 1/2 ; B : 1/2A : 1 ; B : 1/2
A → B : 1
A : 1/2 ; B : 1A : 1 ; B : 1
A→ B : 0
A : 1/2 ; B : 0A : 1 ; B : 0
A → B : 1/2
B : 1/2A : 0
Tableau rules are essentially versions of the truth-table semantics for the target logic, in
our case CC/TT. To see this, consider the first rule for the conditional, the one having
A → B : 1 as premise. From this premise, one derives two nodes as consequences,
one labelled with A : 1 ; B : 1 and one labelled with A : 1/2 ; B : 1. But these two
consequences correspond exactly to the conditions for a conditional A → B to have
value 1 in the truth tables for the Cooper-Cantwell conditional: A → B has value 1 in
these tables if either both A and B have value 1, or if A has value 1/2 and B has value
1 (see Figure 1). Similar considerations apply to the other rules.
We now give a precise characterization of the tableaux generated according to the
above rules, and of CC/TTt-derivability.
Definition 1.1.
- For every formula A, the CC/TTt-n-tableau of A (for n = 0, 1/2, or 1) is the tree whose
root is A : n, and that is obtained by applying the rules of CC/TTt.
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- For every finite set of formulae Γ = {B0, . . . , Bk}, the CC/TTt-〈n0; . . . ; nk〉-tableau of
A (for ni = 0, 1/2, or 1, and i ∈ {0, . . . , k}) is the tree whose root is 〈B0 : n0; . . . ; Bk :
nk〉, obtained by applying the rules of CC/TTt.
2
Since we are only concerned with the tableau calculus for CC/TT in this subsection,
we suppress the label ‘CC/TTt’ whenever possible, to improve readability.
Definition 1.2.
- A branch B of an n-tableau is closed if, for some formula A, there are at least two nodes
in B that have A : m and A : n in their labels, and n 6= m. A branch is open if it is not
closed.
- An n-tableau is closed if all its branches are closed, and open otherwise.
Definition 1.3. For every finite set of formulae Γ of cardinality k and every formula A, A
is CC/TTt-deducible from a Γ, in symbols Γ ⊢CC/TTt A, if and only if all its 〈n0; . . . ; nk〉-
tableaux are closed, where we use the indices n1, . . . , nk−1 to range over elements in {1/2, 1},
and we set nk = 0.
Before proving soundness and completeness for CC/TTt, we give a sample of how
to reason in this calculus. In particular, we prove (one direction of) the commutation
with negation in CC/TTt. The following two closed tableaux establish that A → ¬B
follows from ¬(A → B) in CC/TTt. The first tableau shows that ¬(A → B) cannot
have value 1 while A → ¬B has value 0.
¬(A→ B) : 1 ; A → ¬B : 0
A → B : 0 ; A → ¬B : 0
A : 1/2 ; B : 0 ; A → ¬B : 0
A : 1/2 ; B : 0 ; A : 1/2 ; ¬B : 0
A : 1/2 ; B : 0 ; A : 1/2 ; B : 1
A : 1/2 ; B : 0 ; A : 1 ; ¬B : 0
A : 1 ; B : 0 ; A → ¬B : 0
A : 1 ; B : 0 ; A : 1/2 ; ¬B : 0A : 1 ; B : 0 ; A : 1 ; ¬B : 0
A : 1 ; B : 0 ; A : 1 ; B : 1
The second tableau shows that ¬(A → B) cannot have value 1/2 while A → ¬B has
value 0.
2To ensure uniqueness in the definition of tableaux for more than one sentence, one should fix a
convention for the order in which the CC/TTt rules are applied. Nothing crucial hinges on this, so we
don’t specify any such convention for the sake of readability.
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¬(A → B) : 1/2 ; A→ ¬B : 0
A → B : 1/2 ; A→ ¬B : 0
B : 1/2 ; A → ¬B : 0
B : 1/2 ; A : 1/2 ; ¬B : 0
B : 1/2 ; A : 1/2 ; B : 1
B : 1/2 ; A : 1 ; ¬B : 0
B : 1/2 ; A : 1 ; B : 1
A : 0 ; A→ ¬B : 0
A : 0 ; A : 1/2 ; ¬B : 0A : 0 ; A : 1 ; ¬B : 0
The claim that ¬(A → B) follows from A → ¬B in CC/TTt is established in a similar
fashion.
We now prove that CC/TTt is sound and complete with respect to CC/TT-validity.
Definition 1.4. A quasi-CC-evaluation is a non-total function from the formulae of L→ to
{0, 1/2, 1} that is compatible with the CC truth tables.
More compactly, a quasi-CC-evaluation is a proper subset of a CC-evaluation. For
example, the function that sends p and (p ∧ q) to 1 is a quasi-CC-evaluation.
Lemma 1.5. For every finite set {B1, . . . , Bk} of formulae and every CC-evaluation v, the
completed CC/TTt-tableau whose root is
B1 : v(B1) ; . . . ; Bk : v(Bk)
is open, and all partial functions from sentences to {1, 1/2, 0} induced by its open branches are
quasi-CC-evaluations.
Proof. By induction on the height of the tree.
- The tableau consisting only of the root B1 : v(B1) ; . . . ; Bk : v(Bk) is open.
For suppose it is closed. Then, there are at least two sentences Bi and Bj s.t.
Bi = Bj but v(Bi) 6= v(Bj), against the hypothesis that v is a CC-evaluation: no
CC-evaluation assigns two different values to the same sentence, because CC-
evaluations are functions.
- Assume by the inductive hypothesis (IH) that the (incomplete) tableau Tn whose
root is B1 : v(B1) ; . . . ; Bk : v(Bk) and that has height n is open, and that
its open branches induce quasi-CC-evaluations. Suppose also (in contradiction
with the lemma to be shown) that the tableau Tn+1 of height n+ 1 resulting by
applying one tableau rule to the terminal nodes of Tn is closed. We reason by
cases, according to the last rule applied to the nodes in a branch of Tn (we only
do two cases):
(∧) Suppose a conjunction rule is applied to a node v occurring in an open
branch Bn of height n in Tn, and all the branches of height n+ 1 resulting
from this application are closed. There are three possibilities: v has in its
label A ∧ B : 1, or A ∧ B : 0, or A ∧ B : 1/2.
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- If v has A∧ B : 1 in its label, then there is exactly one successor node v1
in the resulting branch Bn+1 of height n, and v1 has A : 1 ; B : 1 in its
label. If Bn+1 is closed as a result of the addition of v1, this means that
there is at least one node w, a predecessor of v, such that:
w has A : 0 in its label, or
w has A : 1/2 in its label, or
w has B : 0 in its label, or
w has B : 1/2 in its label
Since we assumed that Bn+1 is closed, Bn has a node (namely v) that
has A ∧ B : 1 in its label, and a node (namely w) whose label is as in
one of the cases just listed. By IH, Bn induces a quasi-CC-evaluation.
But no quasi-CC-evaluation assigns value 1 to a conjunction and a value
different from 1 to both conjuncts. Contradiction.
- If v has A ∧ B : 0 or A ∧ B : 1/2 in its label, the reasoning is exactly
analogous to the previous case.
(→) Suppose a conditional rule is applied to a node v occurring in an open
branch Bn of height n in Tn, and all the branches of height n+ 1 resulting
from this application are closed. There are three possibilities: v has in its
label A → B : 1, or A→ B : 0, or A → B : 1/2.
- If v has A → B : 1/2 in its label, then there are exactly two branches
B1n+1 and B
2
n+1 of height n+ 1 extending Bn with three successor nodes
of v, call them v1 and v2 such that:
v1 has A : 0 in its label
v2 has B : 1/2 in its label
Since we assumed that B1n+1 and B
2
n+1 are both closed, then Bn has two
nodes w1 and w2, predecessors of v, such that:
w1 has A : 1 or A : 1/2 in its label
w2 has B : 0 or B : 1 in its label
By IH, Bn induces a quasi-CC-evaluation. But no quasi-CC-evaluation
assigns value 1/2 to a conditional while assigning any of the following
pairs of values to its antecedent and consequent respectively: 〈1, 0〉,
〈1, 1〉, 〈1/2, 0〉, and 〈1/2, 1〉. Contradiction.
- If v0 has A → B : 1 or A → B : 0 in its label, the reasoning is exactly
analogous to the previous case.
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Proposition 1.6 (Soundness). For every finite set Γ of formulae and every formula A:
if Γ ⊢CC/TTt A, then Γ |=CC/TT A
Proof. We prove the contrapositive. Suppose that Γ 6|= A, for Γ = {B1, . . . , Bk}. Then
there is at least one CC-evaluation v such that v(B1) ∈ {1, 1/2}, . . . , v(Bk) ∈ {1, 1/2} but
v(A) = 0. Then, by Lemma 1.5, the tree whose root is labeled as
B1 : v(B1) ; . . . ; Bk : v(Bk) ; A : 0
is open. Therefore, not all the trees whose root is labeled as
B1 : i ; . . . ; Bk : j ; A : 0
where i, j ∈ {1, 1/2}, are closed. But this means that Γ 0CC/TTt A.
We finally show that CC/TTt is complete with respect to CC/TT-validity (for infer-
ences with finite sets of premises).
Lemma 1.7. Every open branch of a completed CC/TTt-tableau induces a quasi-CC-evaluation
that has all the formulae appearing in the branch as its domain and assigns to such formulae
the values assigned in the labels appearing in the branch.
Proof (Sketch). Let T be a completed CC/TTt-tableau with B an open branch. The
branch is finite and it has a unique terminal node v of the form pi : k. Consider now
the partial function that only sends pi to k (i.e., that is constituted by the single pair
〈pi, k〉). This is clearly a quasi-CC-evaluation. Call this function vB0 . Then construct
a new function vB1 that simply adds to v
B
0 every pair 〈A, k〉, where A : k is in the
label of the predecessor of v in B. More generally, let vBn+1 be the function that results
from adding to vBn+1 all the pairs of sentences and values (recall that functions are
extensionally construed as pairs) 〈A, k〉 such that A : k is in the label of the predecessor
of v in B. More generally, let vBi+1 be the function that results from adding to v
B
i all
the pairs of sentences and values (recall that functions are extensionally construed as
pairs) 〈A, k〉 such that A : k is in the label of the predecessor of v in B. Proceed in this
fashion until the root of T is reached. It is easy to show that the resulting function vBn
(for n+ 1 the length of B) is a quasi-CC-evaluation.3
Proposition 1.8 (Completeness). For every finite set Γ of formulae and every formula A:
if Γ |=CC/TT A, then Γ ⊢CC/TTt A
3More precisely, the construction of vBn is a positive elementary definition that closes at ordinal stage
ω. That vBn is a quasi-CC-evaluation follows by a straightforward induction, similar to the one used in
the proof of Lemma 1.5.
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Proof. We prove the contrapositive. Assume Γ 0CC/TTt A. By definition this means
that not all the CC/TTt-tableaux whose root is labeled as
B1 : i ; . . . ; Bk : j ; A : 0
are closed, where i, j ∈ {1, 1/2}. Therefore, at least one such tableau is open. Let B be
an open branch in that tree. By Lemma 1.7, B induces a quasi-CC-evaluation vB such
that
vB(B1) ∈ {1, 1/2}, . . . , vB(Bk) ∈ {1, 1/2}, and vB(A) = 0.
Then vB can be extended to at least one CC-evaluation using Zorn’s Lemma. Call one
such evaluation v. v and vB agree on Γ and A, and therefore
v(B1) ∈ {1, 1/2}, . . . , v(Bk) ∈ {1, 1/2}, and v(A) = 0.
But this means that Γ 6|=CC/TT A.
1.2 Tableau calculus for DF/TT
The tableau calculus for DF/TT, in symbols DF/TTt, is given by the rules of CC/TTt,
with the conditional rule replaced by the following one:
A → B : 1
A : 1 ; B : 1
A → B : 0
A : 1 ; B : 0
A → B : 1/2
B : 1/2A : 1/2A : 0
The notions of DF/TTt-n-tableau, open and closed branch and open and closed
n-tableau, and DF/TTt-deducibility (in symbols ⊢DF/TTt) are easily adapted from the
corresponding definitions for CC/TTt (Definitions 1.1-1.3).
Proposition 1.9 (Soundness and completeness). For every finite set Γ of formulae and
every formula A:
Γ ⊢DF/TTt A if and only if Γ |=DF/TT A
The proof is entirely similar to the proof of Propositions 1.6 and 1.8.
As mentioned at the beginning of §1, tableau calculi are very close to truth table
semantics. They are also quite informative: their construction determines all the pos-
sible truth value assignments that follow from the hypothesis that a given inference
is valid. However, tableau calculi are not a particularly convenient formalism to work
with. In particular, since tableau calculi are refutation calculi, in order to show that A
follows from Γ in a tableau system, one has to show that the hypothesis that Γ holds
while A doesn’t cannot be maintained. In a classical setting, this amounts to showing
that it is not the case that all the sentences in Γ can be assigned value 1 while A is
assigned value 0 by the corresponding tableau. However, in CC/TT and DF/TT we
have three values, two of which are designated, so this is not enough: we have to
exclude that all the sentences in Γ can be assigned a designated value, that is either 1
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or 1/2, while A is assigned value 0. And this requires to consider all the possible com-
binations of assignments of values 1 and 1/2 to sentences in Γ (keeping the assignment
of value 0 to A fixed). Of course, as soon as Γ contains more than 1 sentence, showing
that A follows from Γ requires more than one tableau—more precisely, it requires 2k
tableaux, for k the cardinality of Γ. One might avoid this specific problem by consid-
ering the conjunction of all the sentences in Γ, in symbols
∧
Γ, but this move would
not really make the calculus more convenient to work with. In fact, rather than having
to consider a number of tableaux (depending on the cardinality of Γ), considering
∧
Γ
would yield a single tableau which, however, is in general much larger than each of the
tableaux generated by considering all the possible assignments of designated values
to sentences in Γ. This is because, essentially, one has to iteratively apply the tableau
rules to
∧
Γ until this formula has been decomposed into all its conjuncts – and there
are as many ways to assign value 1 or 1/2 to a conjunction as there are ways to assign
values 1 or 1/2 to the conjuncts. Informally put, considering
∧
Γ would in general
amount to constructing a large tableaux where the ‘smaller’ tableaux generated by the
single assignments to the sentences in Γ are ‘sewn together’.
In addition, tableau calculi are given for inferences with finite sets of premises.
They can be generalized to the case of infinite sets of premises, but this results in
an infinitary formalism, namely a formalism in which one either constructs infinitely
many tableaux, or infinitary tableaux, that is, well-founded trees of transfinite ordinal
lengths.4
For these reasons, we now present another formalisms to capture CC/TT- and
DF/TT-validity: many-sided sequent calculi, in particular three-sided sequent calculi.
Three-sided sequent calculi are a generalization of standard sequent calculi: instead
of building derivation trees labeled with sequents, the rules of the calculus generate
derivation trees labeled with triples of sets of sentences, called three-sided sequents.
Unlike tableaux, sequent calculi are not refutation calculi, and therefore any derivation
of A from Γ establishes that A is provable from Γ. In addition, sequent calculi handle
arbitrary sets of premises, including infinite ones. They can also handle (possibly
infinite) sets of conclusions, and therefore generalize CC/TT- and DF/TT-validity to
multiple conclusions. All these advantages have little costs for the intuitiveness of
the calculus. Even though one cannot represent in a sequent calculus all the possible
outcomes of assigning a given value to a set of sentences, the sequent rules that we
are going to use are very close to the tableau rules, and mirror closely the evaluations
of their target sentences according to the CC and DF truth tables.
4One might argue that inferences with infinite sets of premises do not pose a real problem insofar as
the model-theoretical notion of validity |= one aims at capturing is compact: for every (possibly infinite)
set of formulae Γ and every formula A, Γ |= A if and only if for some finite Γ0 ⊆ Γ, Γ0 |= A. However,
if one knows that A follows from an infinite set premises Γ, compactness only guarantees that there is
at least one finite Γ0 ⊆ Γ from which A follows, but gives no information as to which finite subsets of
Γ entail A. Therefore, having a calculus that handles easily infinite sets of premises is crucial when one
knows that A follows from an infinite set Γ but does not know which finite set of sentences to employ as
premises. We also note that, if one’s calculus does not allow infinite sets of premises, one cannot derive
compactness from completeness, as it is standardly done, and compactness must then be proven with
other tools (e.g., via the Ultrafilter Lemma).
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2 Three-sided sequent calculi
In this section, we introduce sound and complete three-sided sequent calculi for
CC/TT and DF/TT. Since both CC/TT and DF/TT are super-logics of LP (they ex-
tend the latter with a new conditional), we can obtain a sequent calculus by extending
an existing calculus for LP, in particular the three-sided sequent axiomatization of LP
provided by Ripley 2012.5 A three-sided sequent, or a sequent for short, is an object
of the form
Γ | ∆ | Σ
where Γ, ∆, and Σ are sets of formulae. As above, we focus on the calculus for CC/TT,
and then indicate how to adapt it to the case of DF/TT.
2.1 Three-sided sequent calculus for CC/TT
Let CC/TTm be the calculus given by the following principles:
Axiom:
SRef
Γ, A | ∆, A | Σ, A
Rules:
Γ | ∆ | Σ, A
¬-0
Γ,¬A | ∆ | Σ
Γ | ∆, A | Σ
¬-1/2
Γ | ∆,¬A | Σ
Γ, A | ∆ | Σ
¬-1
Γ | ∆ | Σ,¬A
Γ, A, B | ∆ | Σ
∧-0
Γ, A∧ B | ∆ | Σ
Γ | ∆, A | Σ, B Γ | ∆, B | Σ, A Γ | ∆, A, B | Σ
∧-1/2
Γ | ∆, A ∧ B | Σ
Γ | ∆ | Σ, A Γ | ∆ | Σ, B
∧-1
Γ | ∆ | Σ, A ∧ B
Γ | ∆, A | Σ, A Γ, B | ∆ | Σ
→-0
Γ, A → B | ∆ | Σ
Γ, A | ∆, B | Σ
→-1/2
Γ | ∆, A → B | Σ
Γ | ∆, A | Σ, A Γ | ∆ | Σ, B
→-1
Γ | ∆ | Σ, A→ B
5LP, for the ‘Logic of Paradox’, is a paraconsistent logic adopted in some approaches to the semantic
paradoxes. It is the sub-logic of both CC/TT and DF/TT that results from removing the conditional (→)
from the latter, and it is therefore quite natural to axiomatize CC/TT and DF/TT over axiomatizations
of LP. For more on LP and some of its developments, see Asenjo (1966); Priest (1979, 2006); Goodship
(1996); Beall (2009).
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Three-sided sequents have an immediate semantic reading. Consider a sequent
Γ | ∆ | Σ. Intuitively, sentences in Γ should be thought of as having value 0, sen-
tences in ∆ should be thought of as having value 1/2, and sentences in Σ should be
thought of as having value 1. This makes it easy to understand the rationale behind
the sequent rules. For example, consider the rule ¬-0: if A is thought of as having
value 1 (i.e. it appears in the rightmost position in a sequent), then ¬A is thought
of as having value 0 (and is therefore placed in the leftmost position in the sequent).
Similar considerations apply to all the other sequent rules.
A derivation of a sequent Γ | ∆ | Σ in CC/TTm is a tree labeled with sequents,
whose leaves are axioms of CC/TTm and whose remaining nodes are obtained from
their predecessors by applying the CC/TTm-rules. Let Γ ⊢CC/TTm ∆ be a shorthand
for ‘there is a derivation of Γ | ∆ | ∆ in CC/TTm’.
Definition 2.1 (Satisfaction and Validity). A C-evaluation v satisfies a sequent Γ | ∆ | Σ
if:
- there is an A ∈ Γ s.t. v(A) = 0, or
- there is a B ∈ ∆ s.t. v(B) = 1/2, or
- there is a C ∈ Σ s.t. v(C) = 1.
A C-evaluation v is a countermodel for a sequent Γ | ∆ | Σ if v does not satisfy it. A sequent
Γ | ∆ | Σ is CC/TT-valid if it is satisfied by every CC/TT-evaluation.
Let’s expand the notion of CC/TT-validity to allow for multiple conclusion, and say
that Γ |=CC/TT ∆ if every CC-evaluation that makes all sentences of Γ T-true makes
at least one sentence in ∆ T-true. The following lemma, adapted from Ripley 2012, is
immediate from the definition of satisfaction and validity.
Lemma 2.2. For every sets of formulae Γ and ∆:
Γ |=CC/TT ∆ if and only if Γ | ∆ | ∆ is CC/TT-valid
Before establishing soundness and completeness for CC/TTm, we provide an exam-
ple of how one can reason with this calculus. More precisely, we show the equivalence
of A → ¬B and ¬(A → B) within it. By the above lemma, this amounts to deriving
the sequents ¬(A → B) | A → ¬B | A → ¬B and A → ¬B | ¬(A → B) | ¬(A → B).
In the following examples, we use the empty set symbol ∅ only in order to make the
derivations more readable. The following derivation establishes the first sequent:
SRef
A | A, B | A
SRef
A | B, A | B, A
SRef
A, B | B | B
¬-1
A | B | B,¬B
→-1
A | B | B, A→ ¬B
→-1
A | B | A→ B, A → ¬B
¬-1/2
A | ¬B | A → B, A→ ¬B
→-1/2
∅ | A→ ¬B | A→ B, A→ ¬B
¬-0
¬(A → B) | A → ¬B | A → ¬B
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The following derivation establishes the second sequent:
SRef
A → ¬B, A | A, B | A
SRef
A, B | A, B | A
SRef
A, B | B | B
¬-0
A, B,¬B | B | ∅
→-0
A→ ¬B, A, B | B | ∅
→-0
A→ ¬B, A → B, A | B | ∅
→-1/2
A→ ¬B, A→ B | A → B | ∅
¬-1/2
A → ¬B, A → B | ¬(A → B) | ∅
¬-1
A → ¬B | ¬(A → B) | ¬(A → B)
We now proceed to establish soundness and completeness for CC/TTm.
Proposition 2.3 (Soundness). If Γ ⊢CC/TTm ∆, then Γ |=DF/TT ∆.
Proof. By induction on the length of the derivation of Γ | ∆ | ∆.
To prove completeness, we prove the following more general result.
Proposition 2.4. For every triple of sets of formulae Γ, ∆, and Σ, exactly one of the two
following cases is given:
- there is a derivation of Γ | ∆ | Σ in CC/TTm
- Γ | ∆ | Σ has a countermodel.
Proof. We employ the method of Schütte’s search trees, adapted to CC/TTm.6 For
every sequent Γ | ∆ | Σ, such method provides the means to construct a tree labeled
with sequents which either constitutes a derivation of Γ | ∆ | Σ in CC/TTm or can be
used to extract a countermodel to Γ | ∆ | Σ.
We begin by defining three inductive jumps, that extend a given directed tree la-
beled with sequents by applying all the rules of CC/TTm. Formally, such a tree is
constituted by a pair 〈N, S〉, where N is the set of nodes and S is the set of edges,
together with a labeling function, that is, a function from N to their labels (that is, se-
quents). To simplify our presentation, we identify nodes with their labels, and pairs of
nodes with pairs of labels. For every labeled directed tree 〈N, S〉, define the following
sets by positive elementary induction:
- v0 ∈ N+ and 〈v, v0〉 ∈ S+ if:
v ∈ N and
v is labeled with Γ,¬A | ∆ | Σ, and v0 with Γ, | ∆ | Σ, A, or
6Search trees were originally introduced in Schütte 1956. See Pohlers (2009, Chapter 4) for an appli-
cation of this method to one-sided sequents for classical logic, Baaz, Fermüller, and Zach (1992, 1993) for
generalizations and applications to n-sided sequents, and Ripley (2012) for an application to ST.
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v is labeled with Γ | ∆,¬A | Σ, and v0 with Γ, | ∆, A | Σ, or
v is labeled with Γ | ∆ | Σ,¬A, and v0 with Γ, A | ∆ | Σ, or
v is labeled with Γ, A ∧ B | ∆ | Σ, and v0 with Γ, A, B | ∆ | Σ, or
v is labeled with Γ | ∆, A → B | Σ, and v0 with Γ, A | ∆, B | Σ.
- v0, v1 ∈ N† and 〈v, v0〉, 〈v, v1〉 ∈ S† if:
v ∈ N and
v is labeled with Γ | ∆ | Σ, A∧ B, v0 is labeled with Γ | ∆ | Σ, A, and v1 with
Γ | ∆ | Σ, B, or
v is labeled with Γ | ∆ | Σ, A → B, v0 is labeled with Γ | ∆, A | Σ, A, and v1
with Γ | ∆ | Σ, B, or
v is labeled with Γ, A → B | ∆ | Σ, v0 is labeled with Γ | ∆, A | Σ, A, and v1
with Γ, B | ∆ | Σ.
- v0, v1, v2 ∈ N‡ and 〈v, v0〉, 〈v, v1〉, 〈v, v2〉 ∈ S‡ if:
v ∈ N and v is labeled with Γ | ∆, A ∧ B | Σ, v0 is labeled with Γ | ∆, A | Σ, B, v1
is labeled with Γ | ∆, B | Σ, A, and v2 with Γ | ∆, A, B | Σ.
Informally, one can see the jumps +, †, and ‡ as corresponding to the operations of
extending a given labeled tree to another labeled tree, where the sequents that are
added result from applying the rules of CC/TTm ‘upside down’, that is, going from a
sequent to all its possible premises according to the CC/TTm rules.
Now we construct a search tree for a every sequent, that is, a labeled tree where the
above jumps are systematically applied as many times as possible. For every sequent
Γ | ∆ | Σ define (for a limit ordinal δ):
N0 := Γ | ∆ | Σ, S0 := ∅
Nα+1 := (Nα)+ ∪ (Nα)† ∪ (Nα)‡ Sα+1 := (Sα)+ ∪ (Sα)† ∪ (Sα)‡
Nδ :=
⋃
α<δ
Nα Sδ :=
⋃
α<δ
Sα
Finally, define (where Ord is the class of all ordinals):7
N∞ :=
⋃
α∈Ord
Nα S∞ :=
⋃
α∈Ord
Sα
7Since we construct one search tree per sequent, a more perspicuous notation would indicate the
dependence of N∞ on the starting sequent Γ | ∆ | Σ, for example by writing N∞(Γ | ∆ | Σ) (similarly for
S∞ and the ordinal stages). We stick to the simpler notation for readability and because the sequent in
question is clear from the context.
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The tree 〈N∞, S∞〉 is the search tree for Γ | ∆ | Σ. We say that 〈N∞, S∞〉 is closed if all its
branches have finite length and have an axiom of CC/TTm as their topmost nodes, and
that it is open otherwise. Clearly, if 〈N∞, S∞〉 is closed, this very tree provides a proof
of Γ | ∆ | Σ, since its topmost nodes are axioms and all the other nodes are obtained
from their predecessors by applying CC/TTm-rules. Now we show that if 〈N∞, S∞〉 is
open, one can use it to construct a countermodel for Γ | ∆ | Σ.
Suppose 〈N∞, S∞〉 is open, and let B be an open branch in it. Let Γ∞ | ∆∞ | Σ∞ be
the sequent defined as the union of all the sequents in B. More formally:
Γ∞ :=
⋃
Γ0 | ∆0 | Σ0 ∈B
Γ0 ∆∞ :=
⋃
Γ1 | ∆1 | Σ1 ∈B
∆1 Σ∞ :=
⋃
Γ2 | ∆2 | Σ2 ∈B
Σ2
We now have to show that no formula is in Γ∞ ∩∆∞ ∩Σ∞ (otherwise the branch we
are constructing might not provide a countermodel). Suppose that there is a formula
A and there are sequents Γ0 | ∆0 | Σ0, Γ1 | ∆1 | Σ1, and Γ2 | ∆2 | Σ2 such that
A ∈ Γ0 ∩ ∆1 ∩ Σ2. We reason by cases, in order to reach contradictions:
- Suppose A is a propositional variable pi. Since Γ0 | ∆0 | Σ0, Γ1 | ∆1 | Σ1, and
Γ2 | ∆2 | Σ2 all belong to the same open branch B, then they occur at different
heights within B. Suppose without loss of generality that Γ0 | ∆0 | Σ0 occurs at
height n (counting upwards the nodes appearing in B starting from the lowest
node, labeled with Γ | ∆ | Σ), that Γ1 | ∆1 | Σ1 occurs at height n + j, and
that Γ2 | ∆2 | Σ2 occurs at height n+ j+ k (considering different orders would
not make a difference). Since pi ∈ Γ0 and all the rules of CC/TTm are context-
sharing,8 pi is ‘carried upwards’ during the construction of successive stages of
B. Therefore, at height n + j we have that pi ∈ Γ1 and pi ∈ ∆1, and at height
n + j + k we have that pi ∈ Γ2, pi ∈ ∆2, and pi ∈ Σ2. But this means that
Γ2 | ∆2 | Σ2 is an axiom of CC/TTm, and that B is closed. Contradiction.
- Suppose A is a complex formula of complexity n+ 1, and assume the claim as
IH for formulae of complexity up to n. Suppose A is B → C, and that Γ0 | ∆0 | Σ0
occurs at height n, that Γ1 | ∆1 | Σ1 occurs at height n+ j, and that Γ2 | ∆2 | Σ2
occurs at height n+ j+ k. Then:
∗ B ∈ ∆′0 ∩Σ
′
0 and C ∈ Γ
′′
0 where Γ
′
0 | ∆
′
1 | Σ
′
0 and Γ
′′
0 | ∆
′′
0 | Σ
′′
0 are predecessors
of Γ0 | ∆0 | Σ0 in 〈N∞, S∞〉, and one of them is in B.
∗ B ∈ Γ′1 and C ∈ ∆
′
1 where Γ
′
1 | ∆
′
1 | Σ
′
1 is a predecessor of Γ1 | ∆1 | Σ1 in
〈N∞, S∞〉, and is in B.
∗ B ∈ ∆′2∩Σ
′
2 and C ∈ Σ
′′
2 where Γ
′
2 | ∆
′
2 | Σ
′
2 and Γ
′′
2 | ∆
′′
2 | Σ
′′
2 are predecessors
of Γ2 | ∆2 | Σ2 in 〈N∞, S∞〉, and one of them is in B.
Therefore, one of the following is the case:
8That is, sequent rules with more than one premises are applied to sequents with identical side-
formulae, i.e. sharing the sets of premises Γ, ∆, and Σ. See Troelstra and Schwichtenberg (2000, 64 and
following) for more details.
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(i) B ∈ Γ′1 ∩ ∆
′
0 ∩ Σ
′
0, where Γ
′
1 ⊆ Γ∞, ∆
′
0 ⊆ ∆∞, and Σ
′
0 ⊆ Σ∞; or
(ii) B ∈ Γ′1 ∩ ∆
′
2 ∩ Σ
′
2, where Γ
′
1 ⊆ Γ∞, ∆
′
2 ⊆ ∆∞, and Σ
′
2 ⊆ Σ∞; or
(iii) C ∈ Γ′′0 ∩ ∆
′
1 ∩ Σ
′′
2 , where Γ
′′
0 ⊆ Γ∞, ∆
′
1 ⊆ ∆∞, and Σ
′′
2 ⊆ Σ∞;
But all of (i)-(iii) contradict our IH. The cases of the other connectives are similar.
Now that we have shown that the open branch B is such that the unionsets of the
left-, middle-, and right-items in the sequents in B have an empty intersection, that is
that no formula is in Γ∞ ∩ ∆∞ ∩ Σ∞, we can proceed to extract a proper countermodel
from Γ∞, ∆∞, and Σ∞. In order to construct our countermodel, we now define the
following partial function from formulae to {0, 1/2, 1} by simultaneous induction:
w0B(pi) :=


0, if pi /∈ Γ∞ and p ∈ Σ∞
1/2, if pi /∈ ∆∞ and p ∈ Γ∞
1, if pi /∈ Σ∞ and p ∈ ∆∞
wα+1B (A) :=


0, if


A is ¬B and wαB(B) = 1, or
A is B ∧ C and wαB(B) = 0 or w
α
B(C) = 0, or
A is B→ C and wαB(B) = 1 or w
α
B(B) = 1/2,
and wαB(C) = 0
1/2, if


A is ¬B and wαB(B) = 1/2, or
A is B ∧ C and wαB(B) = 1 and w
α
B(C) = 1/2,
or wαB(B) = 1/2 and w
α
B(C) = 1,
or wαB(B) = 1/2 and w
α
B(C) = 1/2
A is B → C and wαB(B) = 0 or w
α
B(C) = 1/2
1, if


A is ¬B and wαB(B) = 0, or
A is B ∧ C and wαB(B) = 1 and w
α
B(C) = 1, or
A is B→ C and wαB(B) = 1 or w
α
B(B) = 1/2,
and wαB(C) = 1
By construction, wB is a quasi-C-evaluation,9 and it can be extended to a C-evaluation
w that agrees with wB on Γ∞ ∪ ∆∞ ∪ Σ∞. Therefore, for every A ∈ Γ∞, B ∈ ∆∞, and
C ∈ Σ∞:
w(A) 6= 0 w(B) 6= 1/2 w(C) 6= 1
But since Γ ⊆ Γ∞, ∆ ⊆ ∆∞, and Σ ⊆ Σ∞, for every A ∈ Γ, B ∈ ∆, and C ∈ Σ:
w(A) 6= 0 w(B) 6= 1/2 w(C) 6= 1
9See Definition 1.4. That wB is a quasi-C-evaluation can be rigorously shown by an induction similar
to the one employed in the proof of Lemma 1.5.
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Therefore, there is a C-evaluation that does not satisfy Γ | ∆ | Σ, namely w.
A few observations on the functions wαB are in order. First of all, the definition of
w0B is in part arbitrary, as other choices of truth value assignments to propositional
variables would have been possible. In order to get a countermodel, one just needs a
function that (i) assigns to the propositional variables in Γ∞, ∆∞, and Σ∞ a value that
is incompatible with the corresponding position of such variables in the union sequent
(and clearly there is more than one choice here) and that (ii) is a quasi-C-evaluation.
Notice moreover that the construction of every wαB is by simultaneous induction, but
every wαB is inductive in Γ∞, ∆∞, and Σ∞, since these sets occur also negatively in the
definition of w0B.
10 This seems unavoidable: there seems to be no definition of ‘having
value 1 if not in Γ∞, 1/2 if not in ∆∞, and 0 if not in Σ∞’ that yields a function and that
is positive in Γ∞, ∆∞, and Σ∞. However, this causes no problem as far as the existence
and uniqueness of wB is concerned, since the existence and uniqueness of Γ∞, ∆∞, and
Σ∞ is immediate by their definition.
Finally, notice that we gave a simplified inductive construction for wB. More specif-
ically, we define wB directly as a function rather than as a positive elementary set of
pairs of sentences and values (then one would have had to show that such set is, in-
deed, a function). Giving a proper positive elementary definition of wB would make
it clearer that its construction is by simultaneous induction, but would be significantly
less readable.
A completeness theorem for CC/TTm is now immediate from Proposition 2.4.
Proposition 2.5 (Completeness). For every set Γ of formulae and every formula A:
if Γ |=CC/TT ∆, then Γ ⊢CC/TTm ∆.
2.2 Three-sided sequent calculus for DF/TT
The three-sided sequent calculus for DF/TT, in symbols DF/TTm, is given by the rules
of CC/TTm, with the conditional rules replaced by the following ones:
Γ | ∆ | Σ, A Γ, B | ∆ | Σ
→-0
Γ, A → B | ∆ | Σ
Γ, A | ∆, A, B | Σ
→-1/2
Γ | ∆, A → B | Σ
Γ | ∆ | Σ, A Γ | ∆ | Σ, B
→-1
Γ | ∆ | Σ, A→ B
The notions of DF/TTm-derivability, as well as of satisfaction and validity of a three-
sided sequent are immediate from the corresponding definitions for CC/TTm (Defini-
tion 2.1).
10See Moschovakis (1974, 17 and following).
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Proposition 2.6 (Soundness and completeness). For every set Γ of formulae and every
formula A:
Γ ⊢DF/TTm A if and only if Γ |=DF/TT A
The proof is entirely similar to the proof of soundness and completeness for CC/TTm.
3 Algebraic semantics
In this section, we explore the algebraic structures that correspond to DF/TT and
CC/TT, and investigate the prospects for an algebraic semantics of these two logics.
We begin by recalling some structures, and introducing the algebraic counterparts of
DF/TT. We start with DF/TT because, as will be clear in Subsection 3.3, it is alge-
braically significantly more tractable than CC/TT. We use overlined uppercase Latin
letters (A, B, C, . . .) to range over sets (supports of algebraic structures) in order to
avoid possible confusions with meta-variables for L→-formulae, and boldface charac-
ters to indicate designated elements of the supports of algebraic structures (1, 0, 1/2,
. . .), in order to avoid possible confusions with truth values in truth table semantics.
3.1 De Finetti algebrae
We begin by some basic definitions, which will be needed for the algebraic semantics
for DF/TT.
Definition 3.1. A structure A = 〈A,⊓,⊔, 0, 1〉, where A is a set and 0, 1 ∈ A, is a dis-
tributive bounded lattice if for every a, b, c ∈ A:
- The lattice conditions are satisfied:
a ⊓ b = b ⊓ a and a ⊔ b = b ⊔ a (commutativity)
a ⊓ (b ⊓ c) = (a ⊓ b) ⊓ c and a ⊔ (b ⊔ c) = (a ⊔ b) ⊔ c (associativity)
a ⊔ (b ⊓ a) = a and a ⊓ (b ⊔ a) = a (absorption)
- The lattice is bounded:
a ⊔ 0 = a
a ⊓ 1 = a
- The lattice is distributive:
a ⊓ (b ⊔ c) = (a ⊓ b) ⊔ (a ⊓ c)
a ⊔ (b ⊓ c) = (a ⊔ b) ⊓ (a ⊔ c)
17
For every lattice A = 〈A,⊓,⊔〉 the order induced by A is the binary relation ⊑ ⊆ (A× A)
such that:
a ⊑ b if and only if a ⊓ b = a if and only if a ⊔ b = b.11
An involution on a lattice A is a unary operation − s.t. for every a, b ∈ A:
If a ⊑ b, then −b ⊑ −a, and
−− a = a
A bounded, distributive, involutive lattice A = 〈A,⊓,⊔,−, 0, 1〉 is a De Morgan algebra if
for every a, b ∈ A:
−(a ⊓ b) = (−a ⊔−b), and
−(a ⊔ b) = (−a ⊓−b)
A De Morgan algebra A = 〈A,⊓,⊔,−, 0, 1〉 is Kleene if, for every a, b ∈ A:
a ⊓−a ⊑ b ⊔−b
A relative pseudocomplementation on a lattice A is a binary operation ֌ s.t. for every
a, b ∈ A:
a ⊓ c ⊑ b if and only if c ⊑ a֌ b for all c ∈ A.
A relatively pseudocompletemented Kleene algebraA = 〈A,⊓,⊔,−,֌, 0, 1〉 is an Ł3 algebra
if for every a ∈ A:
(a֌ 0) ⊔ (−a֌ a) = 1
An Ł3 algebra A = 〈A,⊓,⊔,−,֌,◮, 0, 1, 1/2〉 is de Finetti if:
There is a distinguished element 1/2 ∈ A s.t. −1/2 = 1/2, and
There is an operation ◮ defined on A× A s.t. a ◮ b = (1/2 ⊓−a) ⊔ (a ⊓ b).12
Some remarks on de Finetti algebrae are in order. First, we have defined them over Ł3-
algebrae (also known as Łukasiewicz (or Moisil-Łukasiewicz) trivalent algebrae), but
other options are possible, including MV3-algebrae.13 We have adopted Ł3-algebrae
11Notice that ⊑ is transitive. Suppose that a ⊑ b and b ⊑ c. Then, a ⊔ c = (a ⊓ b) ⊔ c = c ⊔ (a ⊓ b) =
(c ⊔ a) ⊓ (c ⊔ b) = (c ⊔ a) ⊓ (b ⊔ c) = (c ⊔ a) ⊓ c = c (these identities follow from the assumption that
a ⊑ b, commutativity, distributivity, the assumption that b ⊑ c, distributivity again, and absorption, in
this order). The proof for a ⊓ c = a is similar. Therefore, a ⊑ c.
12The definition of Ł3 algebrae follows Milne (2004, 517-518), and so does the characterization of the
algebraic counterpart of the de Finetti conditional over them. We note that Milne considers algebrae of
conditional events, while we consider arbitrary supports. Nothing crucial hinges on this.
13See Gottwald (2001, Ch. 9.2) and Malinowski (1993, Ch. 5). Indeed, while MVn algebrae provide suit-
able algebraic counterparts for every n-valued Łukasiewicz logic (and MV-algebrae algebraically charac-
terize Łukasiewicz continuum-valued logic), Łukasiewicz algebrae only succeed in capturing three- and
four-valued cases.
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both because they are simpler than MVn-algebrae, and in order to better relate our
presentation and results to the elegant formalization and the results of Milne 2004.
Second, de Finetti algebrae have a paraconsistent flavour, suggested by the behaviour
of the element 1/2. Such flavour is more vividly expressed by noticing that they are
both special cases of LP algebrae. In the characterization offered by Pynko (1995), a
Kleene algebra A = 〈A,⊓,⊔,−, 0, 1〉 is LP if it has an inconsistent proper filter on its
support, that is, if there is an F ⊂ A s.t. for every a, b,∈ A and for some c ∈ F
(i) if a ∈ F and a ⊑ b, then b ∈ F,
(ii) if a, b ∈ F, then a ⊓ b ∈ F,
(iii) both c ∈ F and −c ∈ F.
It is easily seen that de Finetti algebrae are LP. Let A be a de Finetti algebra with
support A. The set {a ∈ A | 1/2 ⊑ a} ⊂ A provides the required inconsistent proper
filter.
(i) is immediate, because ⊑ is transitive.
As for (ii), assume that 1/2 ⊑ a and that 1/2 ⊑ b. By Definition 3.1, this
assumption entails that (1/2 ⊔ a) = a and that (1/2 ⊔ b) = b. But since
we have 1/2 ⊔ (a ⊓ b) = (1/2 ⊔ a) ⊓ (1/2 ⊔ b) by distributivity, we also have
(1/2 ⊔ a) ⊓ (1/2⊔ b) = a ⊓ b by our assumption, that is, 1/2 ⊑ a ⊓ b.
As for (iii), notice that both 1/2 and −1/2 are in {a ∈ A | 1/2 ⊑ a}.
3.2 Algebraic semantics for DF/TT
In order to prove algebraic soundness and completeness for DF/TT, we construct the
Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra of a set of formulae, for DF/TTm-deducibility. Therefore,
we first isolate the relation of DF/TTm-provable equivalence (where ‘equivalence’ is
formalized via the DF-biconditional).
Definition 3.2. For every Γ ⊆ For, let ∼df
Γ
⊆ For× For be the relation defined as follows:
A ∼dfΓ B if and only if Γ ⊢DF/TTm A↔ B
This definition, however, does not partition the set of formulae into equivalence
classes, but only into sets that have weaker closure conditions.
Lemma 3.3. In general, ∼df
Γ
is not an equivalence relation on For× For.
Proof. Reflexivity and symmetry hold, since Γ ⊢DF/TTm A ↔ A, and if Γ ⊢DF/TTm A ↔
B, then also Γ ⊢DF/TTm B ↔ A. However, transitivity fails, for otherwise ⊢DF/TTm
would be unsound (consider a DF/TT-evaluation v in which v(A) = 1, v(B) = 1/2,
and v(C) = 0).
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As the above proof shows, the failure of transitivity for DF/TTm-provable equivalence
is closely connected to the failure of Modus Ponens for DF/TT. However, even though
∼df
Γ
is not an equivalence relation on For× For, we will see that it is sufficiently well-
behaved to support an application of the Lindenbaum-Tarski method. More specif-
ically, due to failure of transitivity, ∼df
Γ
fails to partition For × For into equivalence
classes. Nevertheless, we can still use ∼df
Γ
to define sets of sets of formulae which still
support an application of the Lindenbaum-Tarski method, and therefore a proof of
algebraic completeness. This is done in the following definition.
Definition 3.4. For every {Γ, A} ⊆ For, let [A]df
Γ
denote the set of formulae that are provably
DF/TTm-equivalent to A. The quotient induced by ∼df
Γ
on For, in symbols For/∼df
Γ
, is the
set of sets in which ∼df
Γ
subdivides For.
More formally, For/∼df
Γ
is the set of sets {A ∈ For | Γ ⊢DF/TTm A ↔ B for some B ∈
For}. Since we are only concerned with de Finetti algebrae in this subsection, we drop
the superscript df and simply write [A]Γ, in order to improve readability.
Definition 3.5. The de Finetti-Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra of Γ is the structure
D(Γ) = 〈For/∼Γ,⊓Γ,⊔Γ,−Γ,◮Γ, 0Γ, 1/2Γ, 1Γ〉
where:
[A]Γ ⊓Γ [B]Γ := [A ∧ B]Γ
−Γ[A]Γ := [¬A]Γ
[⊥]Γ := 0Γ
[A]Γ ⊔Γ [B]Γ := [A ∨ B]Γ
[A]Γ ◮Γ [B]Γ := [A → B]Γ
[⊤]Γ := 1Γ
[⊥ → ⊤]Γ := 1/2Γ
As shown by Lemma 3.3, ∼Γ is not an equivalence relation, and the sets [A]Γ are not
equivalence classes. Therefore, there is no guarantee that every formula belongs to
exactly one of the elements in For/∼Γ. So, we have to prove that the operations that
characterize de Finetti-Lindenbaum-Tarski algebrae, that is ⊓Γ, ⊔Γ, −Γ, and ◮Γ are ac-
tually well-defined, and do not depend on the choice of particular formulae: otherwise
⊓Γ, ⊔Γ, −Γ, and ◮Γ might not be operations at all. This is done in the following lemma.
Lemma 3.6 (Independence from representatives). For every set {Γ, A, B,C,D} ⊆ For,
the following holds:
- If A ∼Γ B, then ¬A ∼Γ ¬B.
- If A ∼Γ B and C ∼Γ D, then (A ∧ C) ∼Γ (B ∧ D).
- If A ∼Γ B and C ∼Γ D, then (A ∨ C) ∼Γ (B ∨ D).
- If A ∼Γ B and C ∼Γ D, then (A→ C) ∼Γ (B → D).
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Proof. We only show the cases of negation and conditional (the others are similar). For
the case of negation, suppose that there is a set {Γ, A, B} ⊆ For such that A ∼Γ B
but that it is not the case that ¬A ∼Γ ¬B. This means that Γ ⊢DF/TTm A ↔ B but
Γ 6⊢DF/TTm ¬A ↔ ¬B. By the completeness of DF/TTm (Proposition 2.6), this means
that Γ |=DF/TT A ↔ B but Γ 6|=DF/TT ¬A ↔ ¬B. Let v be any DF-evaluation that
assigns value 1 or 1/2 to all the sentences in Γ, value 1 or 1/2 to A ↔ B but value 0 to
¬A ↔ ¬B (if there are no DF-evaluations that assign values 1 or 1/2 to all the sentences
in Γ, the claim is immediate). A biconditional is assigned value 0 by a DF-evaluation
just in case that evaluation assigns value 1 to one side of the biconditional and 0 to
the other. Suppose without loss of generality that v(¬A) = 1 and v(¬B) = 0. Since
v is a DF-evaluation, v(A) = 0 and v(B) = 1. But then v(A ↔ B) = 0, against our
supposition.14
For the case of the conditional, suppose that there is a set {Γ, A, B,C,D} ⊆ For
such that A ∼Γ B and C ∼Γ D but that it is not the case that (A → C) ∼Γ (B → D).
This means that Γ ⊢DF/TTm A ↔ B and Γ ⊢DF/TTm C ↔ D but Γ 6⊢DF/TTm (A →
C) ↔ (B → D). Again by the completeness of DF/TTm (Proposition 2.6), this means
that Γ |=DF/TT A ↔ B and Γ |=DF/TT C ↔ D but Γ 6|=DF/TT (A → C) ↔ (B → D).
Let v be any DF-evaluation that assigns value 1 or 1/2 to all the sentences in Γ, value
1 or 1/2 to A ↔ B and to C ↔ D but value 0 to (A → C) ↔ (B → D) (if there are
no DF-evaluations that assign values 1 or 1/2 to all the sentences in Γ, the claim is
immediate). As noted above, a biconditional is assigned value 0 by a DF-evaluation
just in case that evaluation assigns value 1 to one side of the biconditional and 0 to the
other. Suppose without loss of generality that v(A → C) = 1 and v(B → D) = 0. Since
v is a DF-evaluation, v(A) = v(C) = v(B) = 1 and v(D) = 0. But then v(C ↔ D) = 0,
against our supposition.
Lemma 3.7. For every Γ ⊆ For, D(Γ) is a de Finetti algebra.
Proof. It is easy to see that the properties of distributive bounded lattices hold for
D(Γ). We do just one case of distributivity in detail.
[A]Γ ⊓Γ ([B]Γ ⊔Γ [C]Γ) = [A]Γ ⊓Γ [B ∨ C]Γ definition of D(Γ)
= [A ∧ (B ∨ C)]Γ definition of D(Γ)
= [(A ∧ B) ∨ (A ∧ C)]Γ logic
= [A ∧ B]Γ ⊔Γ [A ∨ C]Γ definition of D(Γ)
= ([A]Γ ⊓Γ [B]Γ) ⊔Γ ([A]Γ ⊓Γ [C]Γ) definition of D(Γ)
The line labeled with ‘logic’ abbreviates the fact that the corresponding identity is
proven by the fact that Γ ⊢DF/TTm (A ∧ (B ∨ C))↔ ((A ∧ B) ∨ (A ∧ C)).
14Notice that the above reasoning breaks down for CC/TT, due to the different truth table for the
conditional (and hence the biconditional). More specifically, a biconditional A ↔ B is assigned value
0 by a CC-evaluation if that evaluation assigns value 1 or 1/2 to one side of the biconditional and 0 to
the other. In the case of a CC-evaluation v that assigns value 1/2 to ¬A and 0 to ¬B, we have that
v(¬A↔ ¬B) = 0 but v(A ↔ B) = 1/2. See also Lemma 3.18 below.
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As for the involution, suppose that [A]Γ ⊑Γ [B]Γ, where ⊑Γ is the partial order
induced on For/∼df
Γ
by ⊓Γ and ⊔Γ. By Definition 3.1, this means that ([A]Γ ⊓Γ [B]Γ) =
[A]Γ. However, (A ∧ B) ↔ A and A → B have the same DF truth table, and are
DF/TTm-provably equivalent. Therefore, in particular, Γ ⊢DF/TTm ((A ∧ B) ↔ A) ↔
A → B. It follows that ⊑Γ inherits the features of ◮Γ in D(Γ), and thus the claim is
established by contraposition. More precisely:15
([A]Γ ⊓Γ [B]Γ) = [A]Γ iff ([A ∧ B]Γ) = [A]Γ
iff Γ ⊢DF/TTm (A ∧ B)↔ A
iff Γ ⊢DF/TTm A → B
iff Γ ⊢DF/TTm ¬B → ¬A
iff Γ ⊢DF/TTm (¬B ∧ ¬A)↔ ¬B
iff ([¬B ∧ ¬A]Γ) = [¬B]Γ
iff (−Γ[B]Γ ⊓Γ −Γ[A]Γ) = −Γ[B]Γ
The second constraint on involution is also satisfied, since Γ ⊢DF/TTm A ↔ ¬¬A.
The De Morgan and Kleene properties, as well as the defining equation of ◮Γ, are
proven in a similar way.
We now provide algebraic counterparts of the notions of evaluation and TT-
consequence. More precisely, we provide a local notion of algebraic TT-consequence
(TT-consequence with respect to a single de Finetti algebra) and a global one (TT-
consequence with respect to a class of de Finetti algebrae). This is done in the next
two definitions.
Definition 3.8. Let D be a de Finetti algebra with support D. A D-evaluation is a function
e : For 7−→ D s.t.:
e(¬A) := −e(A)
e(A ∧ B) := e(A) ⊓ e(B)
e(A ∨ B) := e(A) ⊔ e(B)
e(A → B) := e(A) ◮ e(B)
Definition 3.9. For every class of de Finetti algebrae D, every de Finetti algebra D ∈ D, and
every set {Γ, A} ⊆ For:
A is a D-consequence of Γ, in symbols Γ |=D A if for every D-evaluation e, if for every
B ∈ Γ, e(B) = 1 or 1/2, then e(A) = 1 or 1/2.
A is a D-consequence of Γ, in symbols Γ |=D A, if for every D ∈ D, A is a D-
consequence of Γ.
15Note that the following reasoning does not rely on uses of Modus Ponens in DF/TTm, but can be
carried out using the soundness and completeness of the calculus DF/TTm.
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Notice that, even though de Finetti algebrae include an algebraic counterpart of the
Łukasiewicz trivalent conditional, the latter is not used in defining an algebraic eval-
uation for de Finetti algebrae (and it is not going to be used to construct specific alge-
braic models of DF/TT either). The reason behind this choice is that we want to isolate
the de Finetti conditional, and the respective TT-logic, without including extraneous
connectives (such as the Łukasiewicz conditional). However, it would be possible to
expand our definition of algebraic evaluations and algebraic consequence to include
the Łukasiewicz trivalent conditional, and prove the relative algebraic soundness and
completeness theorems by adding suitable multi-sequent rules to DF/TTm.
We can finally use the structures introduced above, as well as the algebraic notions
of consequence, to establish an algebraic soundness and completeness result. This is
done in the next two results.
Lemma 3.10. For every set {Γ, A} ⊆ For:
Γ ⊢DF/TTm A if and only if Γ |=D(Γ) A
Proof sketch. The left-to-right direction is proven by induction on the length of deriva-
tions in DF/TTm. As for the right-to-left direction, suppose that Γ 6⊢DF/TTm A. By
Proposition 2.4, the sequent Γ | A | A has a countermodel, that is, there is a function
v : For 7−→ {0, 1/2, 1} s.t. for every B ∈ Γ, v(B) = 1/2 or 1, but v(A) = 0.16 Let P be the
set of propositional variables in {Γ, A}. Let e˜ be the partial function e˜ : For ⇀ For/∼df
Γ
defined as follows:
e˜(pi) =


0Γ, if pi ∈ P and v(pi) = 0
1/2Γ, if pi ∈ P and v(pi) = 1/2
1Γ, if pi ∈ P and v(pi) = 1
By Zorn’s Lemma, e˜ can be expanded to a total function e obeying the clauses of
definition 3.8, i.e. a DF-evaluation.17 By Lemma 3.7, e is a D(Γ)-evaluation, and by
construction for every B ∈ Γ, e(B) = 1Γ or 1/2Γ, but e(A) = 0Γ. This shows that
Γ 6|=D(Γ) A, as desired.
Proposition 3.11 (Algebraic soundness and completeness). Let D be the class of all the
de Finetti algebrae. For every set {Γ, A} ⊆ For:
Γ ⊢DF/TTm A if and only if Γ |=D A
16Observe that the range of v is the usual value space of de Finetti evaluations, that is, the set {0, 1/2, 1},
not the set of designated elements 0Γ, 1/2Γ, and 1Γ of D(Γ).
17More specifically, one first observes that e˜ is a quasi-DF-evaluation. It’s easy to check that the collec-
tion of quasi-DF-evaluations and DF-evaluations forms a partially ordered set P, induced by the inclusion
relation (⊆). Moreover, every totally ordered subset Q of P contains an upper bound, that is a quasi-DF-
evaluation or a DF-evaluation which is not extended by any other element in Q. By Zorn’s Lemma, then,
P itself contains a maximal element, i.e. a quasi-DF-evaluations or a DF-evaluation e s.t. e˜ ⊆ e. It is then
immediate to observe than e is a DF-evaluation and not a quasi-DF-evaluation, and hence that e˜ $ e, for
otherwise it would be itself expanded by another element in P, and therefore it would not be maximal.
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Proof sketch. The left-to-right direction is straightforward. As for the right-to-left di-
rection, suppose that Γ 6⊢DF/TTm A. By Lemma 3.10, this entails that Γ 6|=D(Γ) A, which
in turn entails that Γ 6|=D A, as desired.
It should be noted that the proof of algebraic completeness just given is not, strictly
speaking, a genuine algebraic proof: it is parasitic on the Schütte-style completeness
proof given in the previous Subsection 2.1.18 More precisely, the Schütte-style proof
is used to construct a countermodel based on the de Finetti algebra with just three
elements, 0, 1/2, and 1, which is then expanded to an evaluation based on D(Γ).
A typical algebraic proof would proceed by establishing a canonical model theorem;
however, DF/TT does not seem to support this result. We can explain the specific
features of the completeness theorem for DF/TT as follows.19
Lemma 3.10 and Proposition 3.11 entail that Γ |=D(Γ) A if and only if Γ |=D A.
While the right-to-left direction of this biconditional is not surprising,20 its left-to-right
direction yields that A follows from Γ in the specific de Finetti algebra D(Γ) just in case
A follows from Γ in the class of all de Finetti algebrae. That is, the question of whether
A is a consequence of Γ in all de Finetti algebrae is reduced to the question of whether
A is a consequence of Γ in D(Γ). However, this appears less surprising if one considers
how D(Γ) is constructed: in fact, D(Γ) is built using the very sentences that make up
the target inference from Γ to A.21 Indeed, algebraic completeness proofs typically
establish even stronger results, i.e. they establish a canonical model theorem. Such a
theorem guarantees that there is exactly one evaluation e (in our case, it would be a de
Finetti (algebraic) evaluation) which assigns the designated value to all the elements
of Γ such that e assigns the designated value to A if and only if Γ |=D A. That is,
rather than reducing the question of whether A is a consequence of Γ in all algebrae
of a certain kind (again, in our case it would be de Finetti algebrae) to the question of
whether A is a consequence of Γ in a single algebra of that kind, a canonical model
theorem reduces the former question to the question of whether A has a designated
value in a single evaluation. And this is a much stronger result because, in order to
establish that Γ |=D(Γ) A, one has to consider all the de Finetti algebraic evaluations
based on D(A), whereas if a canonical model were available, one would just need
to consider one such evaluation (a particularly informative and ‘canonical’ one). This
happens, for example, in proofs of algebraic completeness for classical logic (with
respect to the class of all Boolean algebrae), and for several other logics as well. Many
of these logics are also algebraizable (which is, typically, an even stronger result).
One can visualize the situation as follows:
18See the proof of Proposition 2.4.
19We thank an anonymous referee for prompting us to comment on this issue.
20Lemma 3.7 establishes that D(Γ) is a de Finetti algebra, and hence D(Γ) ∈ D, as in Proposition 3.11
we explicitly assume that D is the class of all de Finetti algebrae.
21There are immediate parallels outside of abstract algebraic logic if one looks at how Henkin models
are defined in standard completeness proofs for pure classical logic, or if one considers canonical models
in completeness proofs for normal modal logics.
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In the above representation, a circle is an algebra, a dot in a circle is an evaluation
based on that algebra, and the set of circles is a class of algebrae. Our completeness
result establishes that, for every inference, there is one circle such that that inference
is valid in all the circles if and only if it is valid in that circle (which in turn requires
considering all the dots in that circle). A canonical model theorem establish a much
stronger claim, namely that for every inference there is one single dot in one of the
circles such that that inference holds in all the circles if and only if its conclusion
receives the designated value in that dot.
Crucially, however, proving a canonical model theorem typically requires Modus
Ponens. Indeed, an attempted proof of a canonical model theorem for DF/TT breaks
down exactly where Modus Ponens is required. In absence of Modus Ponens, only
the weaker result that Γ |=D(Γ) A if and only if Γ |=D A holds. However, this is
enough for our purposes, that is proving algebraic completeness for DF/TT. In the
next subsection, we will see that things do not work so well for CC/TT and the TT-
logics of Jeffrey conditionals more generally.
We conclude this subsection with a brief discussion of the prospects for a full
algebraizability of DF/TT.22 In this respect, however, DF/TT reveals non-negligible lim-
itations. Let’s start with some preliminary definitions.
Definition 3.12.
- Let an equation, in symbols A ≈ B, be a pair of formulae of L→. The set of all equations
is therefore For× For. A set of equations, i.e. a subset of For× For, is denoted by E.
- Let D be a de Finetti algebra, and let {E,C ≈ D} be a set of equations. D validates
the equational inference from E to C ≈ D, in symbols E |=D C ≈ D, if for every D-
evaluation e if, if for every equation (A ≈ B) ∈ E, e(A) = e(B), then e(C) = e(D).23
- Let D be a class of de Finetti algebrae. D validates the equational inference from E
to C ≈ D, in symbols E |=D A ≈ B, if for every D ∈ D, E |=D A ≈ B.
22The notion of algebraizability (introduced in Blok and Pigozzi 1989) generalizes the link between a
logic and its algebraic semantics, imposing stricter conditions than those required for algebraic complete-
ness. See also Herrmann (1996) and Font (2016, Chapters 2 and 3).
23Informally, D validates the equational inference from E to C ≈ D if every de Finetti evaluation based
on D that satisfies all the equations in E, also satisfies C ≈ D.
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We can now formulate the notion of algebraizability.
Definition 3.13. A logic L is algebraizable if there are a class of algebrae A and functions f :
P(For) 7−→ P(For× For) and g : P(For× For) 7−→ P(For) s.t. for every {Γ, A} ⊆ For:24
(A1) Γ ⊢L A if and only if f [Γ] |=A f (A)
(A2) B ≈ C |=|=A f (g(B ≈ C))
(A1) is a generalization of algebraic completeness, where the right-hand side ex-
presses in the object-language the requirement that A has a designated value when-
ever all the sentences in Γ do.25 (A2) ensures that the solvability of equations is fully
captured by some formula of the object-language.26
However, (A1) and (A2) do not sit well with the conditional of DF/TT. In the
context of DF/TT, the right-hand side of (A1) expresses that whenever all the sentences
in Γ have value 1 or 1/2, so does A. A plausible formalization is obtained by letting f
be f (A) = A ≈ (A↔ ⊤) ∨ (A ↔ (⊥ → ⊤)). f [Γ] |=D f (A) then becomes
⋃
B∈ Γ
B ≈ (B ↔ ⊤) ∨ (B ↔ (⊥ → ⊤)) |=D A ≈ (A↔ ⊤) ∨ (A ↔ (⊥ → ⊤)),
Define g as g(E) = {B ↔ C ∈ For | B ≈ C ∈ E}. (A2) becomes
B ≈ C
|=
|=D (B ↔ C) ≈ ((B ↔ C)↔ ⊤) ∨ ((B ↔ C)↔ (⊥ → ⊤))
which, however, does not express the idea that B and C have the same value whenever
B ↔ C holds in DF/TT. In fact, it is not the case that, in order for B ↔ C to have
the same value as ((B ↔ C) ↔ ⊤) ∨ ((B ↔ C), B has to have the same value as
C; an evaluation e such that e(B) = 1 and e(C) = 1/2 provides a counterexample.
This translates into the algebraic semantics, considering a de Finetti algebra D and an
algebraic evaluation e based on D s.t. e(B) = 1 and e(C) = 1/2 (for 1, 1/2 ∈ D).
Of course, this observation only tells us that B ↔ C does not express the fact that
B and C have the same value—which is not surprising, given the 1- and 1/2-rows of
the truth table of the de Finetti conditional. However, the idea of mapping identity
of semantic values to a formula that expresses ‘having a designated value’ seems at
odds with the conditional of DF/TT, because DF/TT does not distinguish between
1 and 1/2 when it comes to designatedness, nor does its conditional. In a tolerant-
tolerant semantics, validity (and the corresponding conditionals) does not depend on
24Let ‘ f [Γ]’ be a shorthand for { f (B) ∈ P(For× For) | B ∈ Γ}.
25For example, consider the case of classical logic and Boolean algebrae. Letting f be the function
defined as f (A) = A ≈ ⊤, and B be the class of Boolean algebrae, f [Γ] |=B f (A) becomes
⋃
B∈ Γ B ≈
⊤ |=B A ≈ ⊤, which formalizes the idea that whenever every sentence in Γ has value 1, so does A.
26Consider again classical logic and Boolean algebrae. Classically, B and C have the same value just
in case B ≡m C (where ≡m denotes the material biconditional) has value 1. Letting g be s.t. g(E) =
{B ≡m C ∈ For | B ≈ C ∈ E}, B ≈ C
|=
|=B f (g(B ≈ C)) becomes B ≈ C
|=
|=B (B ≡m C) ≈ ⊤, which
express the idea that B and C have the same value whenever the corresponding biconditional holds (i.e.
has value 1) in classical logic.
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the identity of the semantic values that are preserved from premises to conclusion, but
on their similarity: 1 and 1/2 are not identical, but similar enough for DF/TT not to
distinguish them. But condition (A2) can only be satisfied via a formula that captures
a notion of validity based on the identity of semantic values.
This does not show that DF/TT is not algebraizable: here, we leave the question
open. However, the above observations suggest a possible strategy to prove non-
algebraizability: if one can show that a truth-function expressing identity of truth
values is not definable in the truth table semantics for DF, this would translate into the
algebraic semantics, and establish non-algebraizability.27
3.3 An algebraic semantics for CC/TT?
Can we provide a proof of algebraic completeness for CC/TT employing the
Lindenbaum-Tarski method, as we did for DF/TT? The CC/TT-conditional appears
better-behaved than the DF/TT one—in particular because it obeys Modus Ponens—
so this would appear prima facie possible.
Let us try to apply the Lindenbaum-Tarski method to CC/TT. First, we need an
algebraic counterpart of the Cooper-Cantwell conditional. This is provided by the
following definition.
Definition 3.14. An Ł3 algebra A = 〈A,⊓,⊔,−,֌,⊲, 0, 1, 1/2〉 is Cooper-Cantwell if:
There is a distinguished element 1/2 ∈ A s.t. −1/2 = 1/2, and
There is an operation ⊲ defined on A× A s.t. a⊲ b = −w(a)⊔ (w(a) ⊓ b), where w(a)
is a shorthand for −a֌ 1/2.
We then work towards the construction of a Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra for CC/TT.
Definition 3.15. For every Γ ⊆ For, let ∼c
Γ
⊆ For× For be the relation defined as follows:
A ∼cΓ B if and only if Γ ⊢CC/TTm A ↔ B
Since Modus Ponens holds in CC/TT, the relation of CC/TTm-provable equivalence
seems better behaved than the one defined for DF/TTm.
Lemma 3.16. ∼c
Γ
is an equivalence relation on For× For.
Proof. Reflexivity holds since Γ ⊢CC/TTm A ↔ A. Symmetry also holds, since if
Γ ⊢CC/TTm A ↔ B, then also Γ ⊢CC/TTm B ↔ A. Finally, transitivity holds as well,
because if Γ ⊢CC/TTm A ↔ B, and Γ ⊢CC/TTm B ↔ C then Γ ⊢CC/TTm A ↔ C as well.
These equivalences are quickly established semantically, i.e. considering |=CC/TTm
rather than ⊢CC/TTm, by the completeness of CC/TTm.
27This proof strategy seems simpler and more informative than a proof via Isomorphism Theorems,
which are the standard results employed to prove non-algebraizability (see Font 2016, Chapter 3.5).
Another open question is whether DF/TT is algebraizable over other logics. A natural choice would be
Łukasiewicz trivalent logic (with a TT-notion of validity), because de Finetti algebrae are defined over Ł3
algebrae. There are reasons to expect a positive result, namely that the Łukasiewicz trivalent conditional
can be used to express the identity of semantic values, e.g. via ¬((A↔ B)→ ¬(A↔ B)).
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We now have an equivalence relation, so we can use it to partition the set of for-
mulae into equivalence classes.
Definition 3.17. For every {Γ, A} ⊆ For, let [A]c
Γ
denote the equivalence class of A in-
duced by ∼c
Γ
. The quotient induced by ∼c
Γ
on For, in symbols For/∼c
Γ
, is the set of equiva-
lence classes induced by ∼c
Γ
.
Since we only work with Cooper-Cantwell algebrae in this subsection, we drop the
superscript cc again to improve readability, without risks of confusion. Now, in or-
der to proceed with the proof of algebraic completeness, we would have to define
a Cooper-Cantwell version of a Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra. Such a structure would
look as follows:
C(Γ) = 〈For/∼cΓ,⊓Γ,⊔Γ,−Γ,⊲Γ, 0Γ, 1Γ〉
where:
[A]Γ ⊓Γ [B]Γ := [A ∧ B]Γ
−Γ[A]Γ := [¬A]Γ
[⊥]Γ := 0Γ
[A]Γ ⊔Γ [B]Γ := [A ∨ B]Γ
[A]Γ ⊲Γ [B]Γ := [A → B]Γ
[⊤]Γ := 1Γ
[⊥ → ⊤]Γ := 1/2Γ
However, the construction is blocked, because some of its defining operations turn
out to be not well-defined. In particular, the Cooper-Cantwell conditional is not substi-
tutive with respect to negation.
Lemma 3.18. There are sets {Γ, A, B} ⊆ For s.t.
A ∼Γ B but it is not the case that ¬A ∼Γ ¬B
Proof. It is sufficient to set Γ = ∅, A = ⊤, and B = ⊥ → ⊤.
This lemma shows that the process of providing an algebraic semantics (via the stan-
dard Lindenbaum-Tarski method) for CC/TT stops here: it does not even get off the
ground.
In fact, this negative result is more general: it applies to every Jeffrey conditional.
Recall that Jeffrey conditionals are required to obey the condition that f→(1, 0) =
f→(1/2, 0) = 0. Now, the above proof employs exactly the cases in which a conditional
has an antecedent with value 1 and a consequent with value 0, and an antecedent
with value 1 and a consequent with value 1/2. Therefore, no Jeffrey conditional is
substitutive with respect to negation—under a TT-notion of validity, and a Strong
Kleene interpretation of conjunction and negation. In turn, this means that no ‘J-
Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra’, where ‘J’ is any Jeffrey conditional, is well-defined, and
therefore that no algebraic semantics (via the Lindenbaum-Tarski method) is available
for any TT-logic of a Jeffrey conditional.
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4 General Discussion
This two-part paper has reviewed the main motivations for a trivalent semantics for
indicative conditionals, interpreting them as conditional assertions, and defining their
truth conditions in analogy with the conditions that settle the winner of a conditional
bet (i.e., the bet or assertion is declared void when the antecedent is false). Although
the idea goes back to de Finetti (1936), and Reichenbach (1935, 1944), there have been
few explorations of the logics induced by the adoption of that semantic scheme. Be-
side expounding the historical roots of trivalent semantics for conditionals, our paper
has given a systematic survey of the different logics that emerge by (i) choosing a
truth table for the conditional operator in agreement with the above rationale, and (ii)
determining a specific notion of validity (one vs. two designated truth values, pure
vs. mixed consequence relations).
As reviewed in Part I, the trivalent approach yields a fully truth-functional se-
mantics with attractive logical and inferential properties. It also provides the con-
ceptual foundations for a probabilistic theory of assertability and reasoning with con-
ditionals along the lines of Adams (1975). For simple conditionals, combining our
semantics with defining the assertability of a sentence A as the conditional prob-
ability that A is true, given that it has a classical truth value, immediately yields
Adams’ Thesis that Ast(A → C) = p(C|A). This property highlights the potential
of the trivalent approach for guiding an account of the epistemology of condition-
als, and explaining how people reason with them (e.g., Baratgin, Over, and Politzer
2013; Baratgin, Politzer, Over, and Takahashi 2018). While the semantics of the triva-
lent conditional is factual—that is, its truth value is a function of matters in the actual
world—no such limits are imposed on the scope of the probability functions in judg-
ments of assertability (e.g., A can be practically unverifiable, but the conditional may
still be highly assertable).
With respect to the above challenges (i) and (ii), it quickly transpires that any al-
ternative to a tolerant-to-tolerant (TT-) notion of validity would be either too strong
(in the sense of licensing undesirable inferences such as implying the converse cond-
tional) or too weak (in the sense of violating the Identity Law A → A and not having
sentential validities). Only the Cooper-Cantwell conditional, where indeterminate an-
tecedents are exactly treated like true ones, satisfies both the full Deduction Theorem
and commutation with negation. For conceptual, empirical and logical reasons (the
conditional is essentially interpreted as making an assertion upon supposing the an-
tecedent), these are eminently reasonable properties, apparently favoring CC/TT as
the best trivalent logic of the indicative conditional.
The results of Part II nuance this judgment. For both DF/TT and CC/TT we can
develop sound and complete calculi based on tableaux (Section 1) and three-sided se-
quents (Section 2). The latter calculi have the advantage of being simpler and more di-
rect: unlike tableau calculi, they do not establish that an inference is valid by showing
that it is impossible to assign a designated value to the premises and an undesignated
value to the conclusion. Moreover, many-sided sequent calculi make it easier to han-
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dle inferences with multiple conclusions, as well as inferences involving infinite sets
of sentences.
As soon as we consider the algebraic semantics, however, differences between
DF/TT and CC/TT emerge. While provable equivalence fails to be transitive and
therefore induces no equivalence relation for DF/TT (Lemma 3.3), we can still use this
relation to define a Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra and to show an algebraic soundness
and completeness theorem (Proposition 3.11). In other words, A can be derived from Γ
using one of the above calculi (e.g., many-sided sequents) if and only if a consequence
relation holds between Γ and A in the associated de Finetti algebrae. The failure of
Modus Ponens for DF/TT however, blocks the construction of a canonical algebraic
model.
Things look bleak, by contrast, for CC/TT and other TT-logics based on a Jeffrey
conditional. While provable equivalence induces an equivalence relation for these log-
ics, the construction of a Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra does not get off the ground be-
cause provable equivalence fails to be substitutive under negation. More precisely, the
Cooper-Cantwell biconditional ↔ falls short of expressing CC/TT-equivalence since
A ↔ B 6|=CC/TT ¬A ↔ ¬B. Which means that there is not, and cannot be, a fruitful
algebraic treatment of Jeffrey conditionals. In fact, this is grounded in a defining prop-
erty of Jeffrey conditionals: to preserve Modus Ponens and to yield a full Deduction
Theorem, a trivalent conditional based on the “defective” truth table needs to obey
f→(1, 0) = f→(1/2, 0) = 0. It is exactly this property which makes substitution un-
der negation fail (Lemma 3.18), and prevents a proper algebraic semantics for Jeffrey
conditionals.
Clearly, the failure of substitution under negation is closely related to the failure
of contraposition in Jeffrey conditionals—an inference that does not fail in DF/TT.
Indeed, the same evaluation provides the counterexamples employed in proving both
Proposition 5.6 (Part I) and Lemma 3.18 (Part II). So it turns out that what has been
a strength of Jeffrey tolerant-tolerant logics, and CC/TT in particular, at the level of
desirable conditional principles, comes at the price of the algebraic semantics. Im-
portantly, the lack of an algebraic semantics is not a mere technical fact, but it has
philosophical consequences as well. In particular, in every Jeffrey tolerant-tolerant
logic, even if it is the case that A ↔ B, the same equivalence does not hold in gen-
eral for logically complex sentences that result by uniform substitutions of A and B
(see Lemma 3.6 for a formally precise version of this property). Therefore, Jeffrey
conditionals do not provide a workable notion of equivalence.
Of course, the limitations of Jeffrey conditionals just reviewed arise from the com-
bination of the semantics of Jeffrey conditionals, TT-validity, and Strong Kleene con-
junction, disjunction, and negation: one might therefore wonder whether they can be
improved on by altering some of these parameters. However, as the results of Part
I show, adopting an alternative to TT-validity does not seem promising. As for the
semantics of the other connectives, in part I we noted that Cooper adopted alternative
truth tables for conjunction and disjunction, while retaining the K3 table for negation
(see also Humberstone 2011, §7.19, 1044 and following). Cooper’s conjunction and
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disjunction, we noted, lose some classical properties: for instance, in Cooper’s original
system, one cannot in general infer A ∨ B from A, for when A has value 1/2 and B
has value 0, A ∨ B has value 0 as well. With regard to the algebraic semantics, the
difficulties raised in the previous section may not easily be overcome as a result.28
Alternatively, one might inquire into what happens to the interaction of Jeffrey
conditionals with a non-K3 negation. To be sure, the K3-negation squares particularly
well with the philosophical motivation for de Finettian conditionals: when a condi-
tional assertion A → C is “called off” because A is false, the same should happen for
the negation of that assertion (i.e., the sentence A → ¬C, thanks to the commutation
scheme). Nonetheless, it might be worth investigating how Jeffrey logics (keeping a
tolerant-tolerant notion of validity) fare when coupled with what Chemla and Égré
(2019) call a “Gentzen-regular” negation, that is a negation obeying the Gentzen se-
quent calculus rules. While a Gentzen-regular negation might avoid some of the above
problems, it would lose the commutation of conditional and negation, and the attached
connexive principles (see Subsections 5.2 and 5.3 of Part I). In conclusion, there seem
to be structural limitations, or at least unavoidable tradeoffs, that affect Jeffrey condi-
tionals, when it comes to their interaction with other connectives.
We therefore believe that it is not easy to justify a clear preference between the
two logics CC/TT and DF/TTthat we have isolated as most promising amongst triva-
lent logics of indicative conditionals. Both have attractive properties, both have
limitations—but they agree in essential properties such as the valuation of classical
sentences, the Import-Export principle, the analysis of paradoxes of material implica-
tion, their connexive nature, and the connection to a theory of assertability. To solve
the limitations highlighted throughout the paper, one would probably have to give up
one or more of these features. So while there is perhaps no perfect trivalent semantics
for indicative conditionals, they need to be considered carefully between two-valued
logic and modal logics of conditionals. In any event, they give rise to a promising
research program, and we shall support this claim by sketching some future projects
that build on our work in this paper.
Firstly, we would like to extend the current framework to predicate logic and to
investigate how the trivalent conditionals fare in that context, including how they
28A similar application of the Lindenbaum-Tarski method would also likely fail if one replaces strong
Kleene conjunction and disjunction with Cooper’s quasi-conjunction and quasi-disjunction (see Part I,
Section 6), because it only depends on features of the conditional and negation (see Lemma 3.18). How-
ever, we don’t have proper algebraic counterparts of Cooper’s connectives, therefore we can only ad-
vance this claim as a conjecture. In particular, some features of Cooper’s connectives show that they
cannot receive their standard algebraic interpretation. Consider the failure of quasi-disjunction introduc-
tion. Standardly, a disjunction is interpreted as the maximum of the two disjuncts, in some order. In a
bounded lattice, this means that if an element a has a position with respect to the top element, in the
order induced by the lattice, then for every element b, max(a, b) has a position which is at least as close
to the top element as the position of a. But this feature seemingly has to fail for an algebraic representa-
tion of Cooper’s quasi-disjunction, for it corresponds to disjunction introduction. The failure of negated
quasi-conjunction introduction (i.e. that the inference from ¬A to ¬(A ∧ B) is not TT-valid for Cooper’s
quasi-conjunction) seems to have even more far-reaching consequences, for it also involves the involution
defined on the corresponding lattices.
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interact with a naïve or a compositional truth predicate. Secondly, we would like
to apply trivalent semantics to McGee’s famous challenge to Modus Ponens, apply-
ing our accounts of logical consequence and probabilistic assertability (McGee 1985;
Stern and Hartmann 2018). Thirdly, one should review the intuitions and inference
schemes which fuel connexive logics (e.g., Aristotle’s Thesis, Boethius’ Thesis) from
a trivalent perspective, and conduct a more detailed comparison. Finally, we need to
develop more precise criteria as to which inferences should be validated by a trivalent
logic of conditionals, based on the concept of supposition, and which inferences can
be relegated to a probabilistic theory of assertability grounded in the truth conditions.
In other words, we have to formulate a precise account of how the truth conditions of
indicative conditionals relate to reasoning with them.
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